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Introduction
MANY CRIMES TODAY ARE COMMITTED on the Internet. With
each year, new Internet avenues, channels and tools become available.
New applications are popular on mobile devices that were unavailable
only a few years ago. The Internet continues to offer a broadening
and varied opportunity to communicate and access information.
While the Internet has resulted in many positive benefits for soci-
ety, it also offers unique advantages to criminals to exploit victims.
The Internet provides the means to communicate with or access com-
puters around the world in real-time, twenty-four hours a day seven
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days a week. Taking advantage of the global reach of the Internet,
perpetrators may be many time zones away in another jurisdiction or
country. Perpetrators can even be in the same neighborhood as the
victim but may have redirected their Internet transmissions to make it
appear that they are in another country. The Internet provides unique
levels of anonymity as well.1 Active steps to conceal criminal activity on
the Internet may have been taken (such as using a public library com-
puter, using a proxy or “bouncing” through multiple locations).2 The
perpetrator may have taken steps to frame someone else.3 Key records
may have been transferred or deleted after the investigation became
known, complicating the process to recover this evidence. Malware
can be used to exploit and damage a computer or network and to
collect banking information for fraud transactions.4
This Article seeks to provide a better understanding about the
process that law enforcement uses to obtain Internet records under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, as amended
(“ECPA”).5 The process to identify, preserve, request, and obtain In-
ternet evidence can be cumbersome, involving many steps and subject
to numerous delays.6 Because Internet records are retained for a lim-
1. As one example of the anonymity afforded on the Internet to commit crime, in a
“vishing,” or voice phishing scheme, “criminals can take advantage of cheap, anonymous
Internet calling available by using Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”), which also allows
the criminal to use simple software programs to set up a professional sounding automated
customer service line, such as the ones used in most large firms.” The perpetrator, offering
an aura of legitimacy, “emulates a typical bank protocol in which banks encourage clients
to call and authenticate information.” BINATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON CROSS-BORDER
MASS MARKETING FRAUD, REPORT ON PHISHING: A REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 10 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT ON PHISHING], available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/ report_on_phishing.pdf; see also infra note 15 (providing a definition of “vishing”).
2. See infra note 121 and Part II.D.
3. See infra note 83.
4. “Malware” is “[a] program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the
intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data,
applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim.” NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GLOSSARY OF KEY INFORMATION
SECURITY TERMS 115 (Richard Kissel ed., 2011) [hereinafter GLOSSARY OF SECURITY TERMS],
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7298-rev1/nistir-7298-revision1.pdf;
see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MALICIOUS
SOFTWARE (MALWARE): A SECURITY THREAT TO THE INTERNET ECONOMY: MINISTERIAL BACK-
GROUND REPORT 10 (2007) [hereinafter MALWARE REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/53/34/40724457.pdf (describing malware as “a piece of software inserted
into an information system to cause harm to that system or other systems, or to subvert
them for use other than that intended by their owners[.]”).
5. For more on ECPA see infra notes 44–48.
6. The ten steps are described below. See infra Part II.C.
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ited period, from only a few days to a couple months or more, law
enforcement normally is racing to obtain them as new leads are
provided.
The ability of law enforcement to obtain these records impacts at
least six public policy and criminal justice interests, including: (1) pro-
moting confidence in the use of the Internet; (2) addressing the legit-
imate needs of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute crimes
committed over the Internet; (3) addressing the rights and interests of
crime victims; (4) attaining the public policy objectives identified by
Congress in enacting a particular criminal statute; (5) providing a fair
process, ensuring that the responsible perpetrators are identified and
fairly prosecuted; and (6) balancing and respecting privacy interests.
Recent debate and legislation has suggested that the law by which
law enforcement obtains Internet records may be changed. Any pro-
posal that modifies current processes should explicitly answer the
question about how much longer law enforcement would be delayed
in obtaining Internet records under the new standards. If more delay
will result, retention standards should be imposed to ensure that the
Internet trail of evidence will be available upon sufficient legal pro-
cess. Retention standards apply to other information, including medi-
cal, financial and employment records.7
A. Examples of Crimes Involving the Internet
There are many crimes that may be committed either entirely or
at least partially on the Internet. This includes Internet-based crimes
as well as traditional crimes such as murders, violent crimes, kidnap-
pings, and other offenses, in which Internet records have been cre-
ated that are related to the crime and may help solve it. Some
cybercrimes also impact national security and critical infrastructure
concerns.
1. Internet-Based Crimes
According to one recent report, numerous common Internet
crimes are based in fraud such as identity theft, advance fee fraud,
non-auction/non-delivery of merchandise, and overpayment fraud.8
According to the recent 2012 Verizon Data Breach Report, most data
breaches were accomplished by hacking (81% of breaches, compro-
7. See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing retention periods for certain health, banking and
employment records).
8. See INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 2011 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 10 (2012),
available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2011_IC3Report.pdf.
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mising 99% of records) or the use of malware (69% of breaches, 95%
of records).9
Internet-based crimes take many forms. For example, some com-
mon offenses may include: computer intrusions or unauthorized com-
puter access;10 identity theft and aggravated identity theft;11 credit
card or bank fraud;12 “phishing”;13 “spearphishing”;14 “vishing”;15
9. VERIZON COMMC’NS, INC., 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 26, 30
(2012), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-
investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf (reviewing 855 incidents resulting in 174 million
compromised records which includes a study conducted by the Verizon RISK Team with
cooperation from the Australian Federal Police, Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit,
Irish Reporting and Information Security Service, Police Central e-Crime Unit, and United
States Secret Service).
10. Unauthorized access to computers including hacking offenses are normally prose-
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011) (fraud and related activity in connection with com-
puters). There are numerous examples of hacking prosecutions under section 1030(a). See,
e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1143–46 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming con-
viction of computer science student for hacking into a computer system of Qualcomm
Corporation in San Diego from computers at the University of Wisconsin); United States v.
Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 919–22 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming section 1030(a)(5) conviction for
hacking into the Salvation Army computer network and deleting files, shutting down a
computer-operated telephone system and other disruptive conduct); United States v. Phil-
lips, 477 F. 3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming conviction under section 1030(a)(5) for
launching a brute-force attack program on a university system over 14 months to obtain
personal information and Social Security numbers on “more than 45,000 current and pro-
spective students, donors, and alumni”); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367,
367–70 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying motion to dismiss indictment based on unauthorized
access by defendant in Russia to computer servers in Connecticut).
11. Identity theft and aggravated identity theft are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1028 (fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authenti-
cation features, and information), and 1028A (aggravated identity theft) respectively. See,
e.g., Judgment, United States v. Adegoke, No. 1:10-cr-00103-LO (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2010),
ECF No. 29 (defendant sentenced to 102 months in prison and ordered to pay $696,026 in
restitution following his wire fraud and aggravated identity theft convictions in an airline
ticket fraud scheme using email accounts and VOIP); Judgment, United States v. Craig,
No. 08-CR215 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2009), ECF No. 33 (defendant sentenced to 72 months
in prison after compromising the personal data of more than 17,000 active duty and re-
serve military personnel, including their social security numbers, names, and computer-use
profiles, which he attempted to sell to a person he believed was a foreign agent of the
People’s Republic of China); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nigerian National Sen-
tenced to 102 Months in Prison for Role in Airline Ticket Scam (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2010/ adegokeSent.pdf; Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Military Computer Contractor Pleads To Unauthorized Ac-
cess To Military Database and ID Theft (May 2, 2008), available at http:// www.justice.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2008/craigPlea.pdf.
12. Credit card fraud may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029 (fraud and related
activity in connection with access devices) and 1344 (bank fraud). Under section 1029(e),
an “access device” includes “any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial num-
ber, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other telecommuni-
cations service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that
can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods,
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services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds
(other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e). Other
legal theories of criminal liability for these acts, depending on the facts of the case include
18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (fraud by wire, radio, or television) and 1341 (frauds and swindles—mail
fraud). See, e.g., United States v. Drummond, 255 F. App’x 60 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
jury trial conviction for wire fraud and possession of fifteen or more credit card numbers
with the intent to defraud for fraudulent online airline reservation using the identity of
another individual made while the defendant was on supervised release for an earlier
credit card fraud conviction).
13. “Phishing” generally refers to
[T]he creation and use by criminals of e-mails and websites—designed to look
like they come from well-known, legitimate and trusted businesses, financial insti-
tutions and government agencies—in an attempt to gather personal, financial
and sensitive information. These criminals deceive Internet users into disclosing
their bank and financial information or other personal data such as usernames
and passwords, or into unwittingly downloading malicious computer code onto
their computers that can allow the criminals subsequent access to those com-
puters or the users’ financial accounts.
REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 4 (footnote omitted); see also GLOSSARY OF SECURITY
TERMS, supra note 4, at 138 (defining phishing as “[t]ricking individuals into disclosing
sensitive personal information through deceptive computer-based means”).
Phishing cases are normally prosecuted under applicable fraud statutes, depending
how the crime was committed, such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1029, 1030, 1343. See, e.g., United
States v. Blount, 377 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming plea conviction and 48
month sentence for conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices under
section 1029(b)(2) as part of an Internet phishing fraud conspiracy involving more than
250 victims); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, West Haven Man Involved In
Email Phishing and Spamming Scheme Sentenced to Four Years in Prison (Mar. 24, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ct/Press2009/20090324.html. One of the largest
phishing prosecutions to date was prosecuted in the Central District of California, known
as “Operation Phish Phry,” in which nearly 100 persons were charged in the United States
and Egypt. Under the scheme, “Egyptian-based hackers obtained bank account numbers
and related personal identification information from an unknown number of bank cus-
tomers through phishing” and involved participants in both countries. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, One Hundred Linked to International Computer Hacking Ring Charged
by United States and Egypt in Operation Phish Phry (Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Operation
Phish Phry], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/
2009/egyptoperationChar.pdf; see also, e.g., Blount, 377 F. App’x at 57 (affirming 48 month
sentence for “conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2), for his role in an Internet ‘phishing’ fraud conspiracy that en-
snared over 250 victims and resulted in losses of over $120,000”); United States v. Nguyen,
No. 2:07-CR-0164 MCE (E.D. Cal.); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sacramento Man
Charged With Computer Fraud and Aggravated Identity Theft, Internet ‘Phishing’ Scheme
Used to Steal Thousands of Credit and Debit Card Numbers, Social Security Numbers
(April 26, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/
2007/nguyenCharge.pdf; Robert McMillan, Phisher Who Hit 38,500 Gets Long Prison Sentence,
COMPUTERWORLD (July 28, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9218732/
Phisher_who_hit_38_500_gets_long_prison_sentence (“A California man was sentenced to
12 years and seven months in prison Thursday for his role as the brains behind a wide-
spread phishing scam that took in more than 38,000 victims.”).
14. “Spear phishing,” which is a variant of phishing,
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“scareware;”16 “ransomware;”17 trade secret theft and economic espio-
nage,18 criminal spamming;19 the sexual exploitation of children;20
is a technique whereby e-mails that appear genuine are sent to all the employees
or members within a certain company, government agency, organization, or
group. Much like a standard phishing e-mail, the message might look like it
comes from an employer, or from a colleague who might send an e-mail message
to everyone in the company, in an attempt to gain login information. Spear
phishing scams work to gain access to a company’s entire computer system.
REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 3.
15. “Vishing,” another variant of phishing,
involves identity thieves sending an e-mail designed in the same way as a phishing
e-mail, yet instead of providing a fraudulent link to click on, the e-mail provides a
customer service number that the client must call and is then prompted to “log
in” using account numbers and passwords. Alternately, consumers will be called
directly and told that they must call a fraudulent customer service number imme-
diately in order to protect their account.
REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 3.
16. “Scareware” is defined as “malicious computer programs designed to trick a user
into buying and downloading unnecessary and potentially dangerous software, such as fake
antivirus protection[.]” Scareware, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/ english/scareware (last visited Jan 21, 2013); see also, e.g., Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Indicts Ohio Man And Two Foreign Residents In Alleged Ukraine-
Based “Scareware” Fraud Scheme That Caused $100 Million In Losses To Internet Victims
Worldwide (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-
releases/2010/sundinIndict.pdf; FRANC¸OIS PAGET, MCAFEE, INC., RUNNING SCARED: FAKE SE-
CURITY SOFTWARE RAKES IN MONEY AROUND THE WORLD (2010), available at http://www.
mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-running-scared-fake-security-software.pdf.
17. “Ransomware” is used to describe:
the type of malware that can infect a PC and then lock the user’s data most com-
monly by encrypting files or by injecting a rogue MBR (master boot record) to
the system’s start-up routine. . . . While the user’s files are typically locked until
the ransom is paid, the victim is still free to browse the Internet, thus allowing the
banking Trojan to continue collecting information on the victim uninterrupted.
EMC CORP., RANSOMWARE: INFECT ME NOT 1 (2012), available at http://www.rsa.com/solu-
tions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/11733_Online_Fraud_report_0612.pdf; see
also John E. Dunn, Ransom Trojans Spreading Beyond Russian Heartland, TECHWORLD (March
9, 2012), http://news.techworld.com/security/3343528/ransom-trojans-spreading-be-
yond-russian-heartland; Intelligence Note: Citadel Malware Delivers Reveton Ransomware in At-
tempts to Extort Money, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER (May 30, 2012), http:// www.ic3.
gov/media/2012/120530.aspx (describing the ransomware as “an attempt to extort money
with the additional possibility of the victim’s computer being used to participate in online
bank fraud”).
18. Economic espionage and trade secret theft, involving the criminal misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39. See Mark Krotoski, Identi-
fying and Using Electronic Evidence Early to Investigate and Prosecute Trade Secret and Economic
Espionage Act Cases, 57 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 42, 43–46 (Nov. 2009) (providing examples of
electronic evidence used in trade secret and economic espionage cases), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf [hereinafter Electronic
Evidence In EEA Cases]. United States v. Meng provides an example of an economic espionage
case involving email communications. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Meng, CR 04-
20216 JF (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007); infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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cyberstalking;21 transmitting threatening communications on the in-
ternet;22 distribution of unlawful materials; copyright infringement;23
19. Criminal spamming is prosecuted under the CAN-SPAM Act. Controlling the As-
sault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM Act), Pub. L. No. 108-
187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1037). There are numerous examples of CAN-
SPAM Act prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009)
(affirming jury conviction for CAN-SPAM and related violations involving the operation of
an International pornographic spamming business); Indictment, United States v. Ralsky,
No. 2:07-cr-20627-MOB-RSW (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2008), ECF No. 4 (eleven defendants
charged with CAN-SPAM and related charges for multi-million dollar e-mail stock fraud
scheme). See generally Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Detroit Spammer and
Three Co-Conspirators Sentenced for Multi-Million Dollar E-Mail Stock Fraud Scheme,
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ November/09-crm-1275.html (three de-
fendants sentenced to 40 and 51 months in prison). SPAM is defined as the “abuse of
electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately send unsolicited bulk messages.” GLOS-
SARY OF SECURITY TERMS, supra note 4, at 180.
20. Child sexual exploitation offenses may include 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 (sexual exploita-
tion of children including production of child pornography), 2251A (selling or buying of
children), 2252 (possession, distribution and receipt of child pornography), 2252A (cer-
tain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography), 2260
(production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United
States), 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse), 2242 (sexual abuse), 2243 (sexual abuse of a mi-
nor or ward), 2244 (abusive sexual contact). The Internet is often used as a vehicle to
commit these offenses. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 109TH CONG.,
REP. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET (Comm. Print 2007)
[hereinafter STAFF REPORT: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET],
available at http:// republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/01032007_Report.
pdf (“Crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet are a growing
problem in the U.S. and around the world, due to the ease with which pedophiles and
child predators can trade, sell, view, and download images of child pornography from the
Internet.”). Examples of child sexual exploitation cases that could not be solved based on
the unavailability of provider records are treated below. See infra notes 56–57 and accompa-
nying text.
21. Cyberstalking may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. See, e.g., United States
v. Rose, 315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming 120 month sentence for interstate
stalking and threatening communications which included “threatening and vulgar e-mail
and telephone messages” sent to the victim and her family).
22. Threatening communications transmitted over the Internet may be prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). See, e.g., Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 710 (2008) (in
considering sentencing issue, case involved section 875(c) conviction for sending “an e-
mail threatening to kill his ex-wife and her new husband” and for sending ‘dozens’ of
similar e-mails in violation of a restraining order”); United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d
1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming section 875(c) conviction for transmitting a bomb
threat via AOL “instant message”; interstate requirement applied to the transmission by the
defendant to the recipient in the same state since the threatening communication was
transmitted “traveled out of Utah to Virginia” where AOL servers were located “before
returning to Utah”).
23. Copyright infringement may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2319. See, e.g.,
United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming convictions and sentences
for 24 and 8 months for two defendants convicted for to commit copyright infringement of
copyrighted software over the Internet through a group known as “Pirates With Atti-
tudes”); Criminal Minute Order, United States v. Fish, No. 5:06-cr-00109-RMW (N.D. Cal.
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illegal wiretap;24 and obstruction of justice (by deleting Internet
records known to be within the scope of an investigation),25 to name
only a few.
2. Traditional Crimes Involving Internet Evidence
The use of Internet evidence is not limited to crimes committed
exclusively or substantially on the Internet. The investigation and res-
olution of more traditional crimes may also rely on Internet evidence.
Murder cases have been solved by Internet or electronic evi-
dence.26 In one murder case, for example, text messages from the
defendant’s cell phone carrier provided key evidence. Normally, text
messages are only retained for a few days. However, in this case, the
records had unexpectedly been preserved. Along with other cell tower
data, the text messages were “the single most important piece of evi-
dence in linking the defendant to the” murders of a 22-year old and
May 9, 2008), ECF. No. 18 (defendant who served as a site operator, scripter, equipment
supplier, broker and encoder for warez sites, distributing newly released movies, games,
software and music online, was sentenced to 30 month in prison); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Connecticut Man Sentenced To 30 Months In Prison For Criminal Copyright
Infringement (Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
press-releases/2008/fishSent.pdf (noting that forty individuals were convicted during the
investigation known as Operation Copycat and Operation Site Down).
24. An illegal interception may violate the Wiretap Act, under ECPA, Title I, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–22. See, e.g., United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2010)
(affirming section 2511 conviction for employee monitoring and intercepting email com-
munications sent to his supervisor).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming
obstruction of justice trial conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for the deletion of computer
information relating to unauthorized access to the email account of Alaska Governor and
Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin); United States v. Smyth, 213 F. App’x 102, 102 (3d
Cir. 2007) (defendant pled guilty to violating section 1519 for destroying a computer hard
drive with intent to obstruct a federal investigation of child pornography); United States v.
Fumo, 628 F. Supp. 2d 573, 599 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (affirming use of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 to
conspiracy to “obstruct justice by destroying electronic evidence, including e-mail commu-
nications pertaining to matters within the scope of a federal criminal investigation”).
26. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Computer Disk Led to Arrest in Killings, Pastor Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/02/national/02btk.html (in the “bind,
torture, and kill” murders, information on the computer disk in the defendant’s final mail-
ing was used “to trace it back to a computer at Christ Lutheran Church” that the defendant
“had used . . . a few weeks earlier”); Eli Ross, Thursday Testimony in Baker Murder Trial Filled
With Twists, Turns, Technical Talk, KWTX.COM (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.kwtx.com/
home/headlines/ 81127767.html (in homicide of former minister’s wife, originally ruled a
suicide, the computer forensic trial testimony revealed the defendant had searched on the
Internet for the phrase “overdose on sleeping pills”); Richard Williams, Baby Video Torture
Killer an ‘Evil Monster.’ SKY NEWS ONLINE (Dec. 2, 2010), http://news.sky.com/skynews/
Home/UK-News/Charlie-Hunt-Murderer-Of-Baby-Filmed-While-He-Was-Tortured-Darren-
Newton-Branded-Evil-Monster/Article/201012115845372?f=rss (mobile phone used to
video torture of baby who was murdered).
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her 10-month old son.27 Kidnappings and violent crimes have been
resolved with cell site data from providers.28
In sum, any crime committed using the Internet, cell phones or
other similar devices may have electronic evidence records that may
be used to solve the crime. The ability to obtain this evidence, which
may be essential to solving the crime, may turn on the availability of
the Internet records.
3. National Security and Critical Infrastructure Concerns
The inability of law enforcement to obtain Internet records also
has national security and critical infrastructure implications. Cyber at-
tacks have been increasing exponentially. As the 2012 National
Preparedness Report noted:
Cyber attacks have increased significantly in number and sophisti-
cation in recent years, resulting in the Federal Government and
private sector partners expanding their cybersecurity efforts. The
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) reported
an over 650-percent increase in the number of cyber incidents re-
ported by federal agencies over a five-year period, from 5,503 in FY
2006, to 41,776 in FY 2010. Almost two-thirds of U.S. firms report
that they have been the victim of cybersecurity incidents or infor-
mation breaches. Moreover, this serious problem may be subject to
underreporting: only 50 percent of owners and operators at high-
priority facilities participating in the ECIP security survey said that
they report cyber incidents to external parties. DHS’s Strategic Na-
tional Risk Assessment notes that cyber attacks can have cata-
strophic consequences and trigger cascading effects across critical
infrastructure sectors.29
In congressional testimony, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
noted the risks to our critical infrastructure from cyber attacks:
U.S. critical infrastructure faces a growing cyber threat due to ad-
vancements in the availability and sophistication of malicious
27. See, e.g., Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography and Other
Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 16–17, 20–21 (2011) [hereinafter House Hearings: Data
Retention As a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes] (statement of John M. Douglass, Chief Of
Police, Overland Park, Kansas; International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria,
Virginia), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-3_63873.
pdf.
28. See, e.g., Thomas A. O’Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Nov. 2011, at 16, 24, available at www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usab5906.pdf (noting how historical cell site analysis has led to the
“identification and arrests of violent felons, including murder suspects, and the rescue of
kidnapping and child abduction victims”).
29. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT 20 (2012), availa-
ble at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=707308.
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software tools, and the fact that new technologies raise new security
issues that cannot always be addressed prior to adoption. The in-
creasing automation of our critical infrastructures provides more
cyber access points for adversaries to exploit.30
The impact of cybercrime on national security remains height-
ened. Earlier this year, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Rob-
ert S. Mueller, III, described multiple avenues in which cybercrime
may threaten national security:
Terrorist use of the Internet is not our only national security con-
cern. As we know, state-sponsored computer hacking and eco-
nomic espionage pose significant challenges. Just as traditional
crime has migrated online, so, too, has espionage. Hostile foreign
nations seek our intellectual property and our trade secrets for mil-
itary and competitive advantage. State-sponsored hackers are pa-
tient and calculating. They have the time, the money, and the
resources to burrow in, and to wait. They may come and go, con-
ducting reconnaissance and exfiltrating bits of seemingly innocu-
ous information—information that in the aggregate may be of
high value. You may discover one breach, only to find that the real
damage has been done at a much higher level.31
General Keith Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Chief,
Central Security Service and Commander, United States Cyber Com-
mand, concluded that cybercrime has resulted in “the greatest trans-
fer of wealth in history.”32 In October, Secretary of Defense Leon E.
Panetta described the impact that a targeted cyber attack could have:
30. Cyber Security: Responding to the Threat of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 122 (2011)
(statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg71412/pdf/
CHRG-112shrg71412.pdf; id. at 6 (“The recent security breach by unauthorized intruders
into the parent company of NASDAQ is an example of the kind of breaches directed
against important financial infrastructure.”).
31. Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at RSA Cyber
Security Conference (March 1, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies. Other coun-
tries have highlighted the threat of cybercrime to national security. See, e.g., PRIME MINIS-
TER’S OFFICE, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY, 2010, Cm. 7953, at 1, 29 (U.K.), available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_
consum_dg/groups/ dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?
CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy (“[C]yber security has been assessed as
one of the highest priority national security risks to the UK.”).
32. Emil Protalinski, NSA: Cybercrime is ‘the Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History’, ZDNET
(July 10, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-cybercrime-is-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-
history-7000000598/; see also Emil Protalinski, Richard Clarke: China Has Hacked Every Major
US Company, ZDNET (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/richard-clarke-
china-has-hacked-every-major-us-company/11125 (quoting former White House cyber-
security and cyberterrorism advisor in stating that “‘[e]very major company in the United
States has already been penetrated by China. My greatest fear is that, rather than having a
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An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of
cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could, for ex-
ample, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail
trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the
water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across
large parts of the country. The most destructive scenarios involve
cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure
at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country.
Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military sys-
tems and communication networks. The collective result of these
kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that
would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. In fact, it
would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound
sense of vulnerability.33
To counter these growing cyber attacks, law enforcement will
need the capacity to trace the manner in which they are committed
and to obtain the necessary electronic records. Law enforcement re-
quires sufficient tools to respond to sophisticated cyber attacks in or-
der to uncover and prosecute them.
4. Electronic Records: Many Forms
Criminal Internet activity can result in the creation of many dif-
ferent types of records. Illustratively, such records may include: trans-
actional records which show what Internet Protocol address was used
for access and the path of the Internet transmission; text messages or
email communications; social networking channels; the uploading or
downloading of files or information; steps taken to store information
in other places such as in the cloud;34 the use of peer-to-peer pro-
cyber-Pearl Harbor event, we will instead have this death of a thousand cuts. Where we lose
our competitiveness by having all of our research and development stolen by the Chinese.
And we never really see the single event that makes us do something about it’”); Josh
Rogin, NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the “Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History,” THE CABLE
(July 9, 2012), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2012/07/09/nsa_chief_cyber
crime_constitutes_the_greatest_transfer_of_wealth_in_history.
33. Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Remarks on Cybersecurity to the
Business Executives for National Security (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.defense.
gov/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.
34. “Cloud computing” is defined as:
[A] model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with mini-
mal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is com-
posed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment
models.
PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (2011), available at http:// csrc.nist.gov/publi-
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grams to share or transfer files; financial transactions online; voice
over Internet Protocol communications; the use of someone else’s
wireless Internet;35 and log records which show the date and time of
activity on the Internet.36
The trail of electronic records from the Internet may show: how
the crime was committed; reveal communications about planning and
preparation; identify who committed the crime or reveal other co-con-
spirators; identify additional victims; show how money was transferred;
corroborate other known evidence; fill in gaps in the evidence; con-
firm that records were destroyed once the investigation became
known; and provide new leads. Electronic evidence might even ex-
clude initial suspects or show that someone was framed. As important
as these records may be, they may not be available at the time law
enforcement learns about their existence. Based on a provider’s reten-
tion policy, it may be too late to obtain legal process for these records.
This means that key evidence may not be available to help solve a
crime.
5. Measuring Loss and the Impact on Society
When crimes are committed using the Internet, the loss to indi-
viduals and society can take many forms. There are direct and indirect
costs. In some cases, damages have jumped to millions or billions of
dollars by impacting numerous individuals and networks.37
cations/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf; see also GLOSSARY OF SECURITY TERMS, supra note
4, at 35.
35. See, e.g., infra note 83 (highlighting the case of United States v. Ardolf, in which the
defendant used his neighbor’s wireless Internet to engage in criminal activity so the defen-
dant’s Internet conduct would “be traced back to the neighbor”).
36. Mark L. Krotoski & Jason Passwaters, Using Log Record Analysis to Show Internet and
Computer Activity in Criminal Cases, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Nov. 2011, at 1, 5 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Using Log Record Analysis], available at www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usab5906.pdf (“In past cases, many providers have maintained log records for only a few
days. Other providers may retain the records for a week or so. Some providers may not log
all events.”).
37. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, International Cooperation
Disrupts Multi-Country Cyber Theft Ring (Oct. 1, 2010) available at http://www.fbi.gov/
news/pressrel/ press-releases/international-cooperation-disrupts-multi-country-cyber-theft-
ring (“[In Operation Trident Breach, the] cyber thieves targeted small- to medium-sized
companies, municipalities, churches, and individuals, infecting their computers using a
version of the Zeus Botnet. The malware captured passwords, account numbers, and other
data used to log into online banking accounts. This scheme resulted in the attempted theft
of $220 million, with actual losses of $70 million from victims’ bank accounts.”); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Indicts Ohio Man And Two Foreign Residents In Al-
leged Ukraine-Based “Scareware” Fraud Scheme That Caused $100 Million In Losses To
Internet Victims Worldwide (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
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While the true costs of cybercrime are very difficult to gauge,38 on
one level, the loss may be the damages or direct financial impact re-
sulting from the crime. In the criminal justice process, the court will
seek to determine restitution to make the victim whole.39
The loss will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. In
computer hacking cases, for example, loss generally falls into four cat-
egories: “[1] the cost of responding to an offense, [2] conducting a
damage assessment, and [3] restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and [4] any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because
of interruption of service.”40 In a data breach case, some of the costs
may include “detection, escalation, notification and response along
with legal, investigative and administrative expenses, customer defec-
tions, opportunity loss, reputation management, and costs associated
with customer support such as information hotlines and credit moni-
toring subscriptions.”41
There are also indirect costs resulting from Internet crime. Busi-
nesses may face brand damage and lost customers.42 Depending on
the nature of the crime, individuals may confront mental health and
related issues. For example, the trauma resulting from child exploita-
tion can leave scars that remain for many years. The direct costs from
child exploitation may include hospitalization, mental health child
cybercrime/press-releases/2010/sundinIndict.pdf; Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bu-
reau of Investigation, Remarks at Detroit Economic Club (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http:/
/www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/protecting-the-u.s.-economy-in-a-global-age (noting that
“[b]y the time the ‘Love [Bug]’ virus had run its course, millions of systems had been
disrupted [and the] total damages worldwide were estimated at $8 to $10 billion”).
38. The true costs of cybercrime have been difficult to measure because some cyber-
crime is never reported. Some studies are based on unverified, self-reported information.
For example, the recent 2012 Norton Cybercrime Report, which is a survey of 13,000 adults
in 24 countries based on self-reported cybercrime, estimated $110 billion annual losses. See
Press Release, Symantec Corp., Consumer Cybercrime Estimated at $110 Billion Annually
(Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?
prid=20120905_02; SYMANTEC CORP., 2012 NORTON CYBERCRIME REPORT 3 (2012), available
at http://now-static.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrimeRe-
port/2012_Norton_Cybercrime_Report_Master_FINAL_050912.pdf.
39. For more on restitution see infra note 68.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2011) (defining “loss” for offenses under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act).
41. Ponemon Study Shows the Cost of a Data Breach Continues to Increase, PONEMON INST.
(Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.ponemon.org/news-2/23.
42. Yuval Ben-Itzhak, Businesses Under Cybercrime Attack: How to Protect Your Corporate
Network and Data Against Its Impact, CXO (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.cxo.eu.com/article/
Businesses-under-Cybercrime-attack/ (“Once a business or organization is exposed in the
media for breaching data, it faces a high chance of brand damage – especially when the
media coverage of the breach includes financial and legal details.”).
304 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
welfare services, and law enforcement responses. The indirect costs
may involve special education, juvenile delinquency, mental health
care, and the criminal justice system.43
As these examples show, the nature of the loss, including direct
and indirect costs, will vary depending on the type of case and the
facts. The costs of Internet crime have significant consequences for
individuals, businesses, and society. The role of law enforcement is to
enforce the law, identify the perpetrator(s), hold them accountable in
the criminal justice system, and, where possible, seek restitution for
the victims.
6. Summary: Without Access to Internet Evidence Through
Appropriate Legal Process, the Adverse Impacts from
Crimes Committed on the Internet Will Remain
Unaddressed
Law enforcement requires the necessary tools to combat cyber-
crime effectively. For crimes committed on the Internet, the trail of
evidence will include records created by the defendant on the In-
ternet. Ensuring that essential electronic data is retained pending ap-
propriate legal process is critical to solving these crimes and
redressing the adverse impacts of these crimes on society.
These concerns are not limited to law enforcement. Policy mak-
ers and others concerned about cyber attacks on our critical infra-
structure, financial institutions and businesses should be concerned
about data retention. Parents and families concerned about the ex-
ploitation of children should be interested in ensuring that perpetra-
tors can be identified and held accountable. Supporters of the
enforcement of other laws enacted by Congress that are violated by
using the Internet should care about data retention.
In order to solve crimes committed over the Internet, some of the
best evidence necessarily involves Internet records. Obtaining these
records in a law enforcement investigation can be challenging; their
43. See TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT: VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 1, 12 (1996),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/victcost.pdf (noting “the cost of mental health
care for the typical child sexual abuse victim” is much higher than for other crimes); see
generally CHING-TUNG WANG & JOHN HOLTON, PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., TOTAL ESTIMATED
COST OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2007), available at http://
www.preventchildabuse.org/about_us/media_releases/pcaa_pew_economic_impact_study
_final.pdf (while noting the challenges in estimating the direct and indirect costs of child
abuse and neglect, the report provides a conservative estimate of “$103.8 billion in 2007
value” of indirect costs).
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availability often turns on whether they are still retained by the pro-
vider. Time is usually dispositive. Law enforcement is typically en-
gaged in a race to obtain the electronic evidence as leads are
developed while the data is still available from a provider.44
B. Following the Trail of Internet Evidence: Obtaining Electronic
Evidence Under ECPA
Law enforcement usually obtains these Internet records by meet-
ing the requirements set forth in ECPA.45 The Stored Communica-
tions Act (“SCA”),46 which is Title II of ECPA, generally regulates
access to “stored wire and electronic communications and transac-
tional records”47 maintained by providers.
By enacting ECPA, Congress weighed different public interests.
The House report noted that the ECPA measure “represents a fair
balance between the privacy expectations of citizens and the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement.”48 More than a quarter century after
ECPA was enacted these competing interests and the question of their
proper balance remain; in fact, they are more important today. Re-
lated public policy and criminal justice interests, reviewed below in
Part I, include: (1) promoting confidence in the use of the Internet;
(2) addressing the legitimate needs of law enforcement to investigate
44. This article generally refers to “providers” who furnish Internet services that are
subject to the requirements ECPA. ECPA actually distinguishes between “a provider of re-
mote computing service” and “a provider of electronic communications services.” See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining “electronic communications services”); id. § 2711(2) (defin-
ing “remote computing service”); see generally COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SEC-
TION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 117–20 (3d. ed. 2009), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf (explaining
and providing examples of remote and electronic communications services).
45. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (Oct. 21, 1986). ECPA has three titles: Title I
includes the Wiretap Act, which prohibits the interception, use, and disclosure of wire,
oral, or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22. Title II contains the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”). See id. §§ 2701–12. Title III pertains to the use of pen regis-
ters and trap and trace devices. See id. §§ 3121–27.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 8 (1986) (Title II-Stored Wire And Electronic Communi-
cations And Transactional Records Access).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16, 19 (1986) (“The purpose of the legislation is to
amend title 18 of the United States Code to prohibit the interception of certain electronic
communications; to provide procedures for interception of electronic communications by
federal law enforcement officers; to provide procedures for access to communications
records by federal law enforcement officers; to provide procedures for federal law enforce-
ment access to electronically stored communications; and to ease certain procedural re-
quirements for interception of wire communications by federal law enforcement
officers.”).
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and prosecute crimes committed over the Internet; (3) addressing the
rights and interests of crime victims; (4) attaining the public policy
objectives identified by Congress in enacting a particular criminal stat-
ute; (5) providing a fair process, ensuring that the responsible perpe-
trators are identified and fairly prosecuted; and (6) balancing and
respecting privacy interests.
C. Obtaining Electronic Evidence: Contrasting Case Examples
Based on the Availability of Internet Records from the
Provider
Two case examples demonstrate the importance of obtaining
ECPA records to investigate and prosecute crimes committed, at least
in part, on the Internet.49 One was successful, the other tragically was
not. The outcome turned on the availability of records from the
provider.
1. Successful Preservation of Emails
First, in United States v. Xiaodong Sheldon Meng,50 a timely law en-
forcement request to preserve email evidence saved a large number of
emails just before someone in another country tried to delete them
after the investigation became publicly known.51 Sheldon Meng, a
software engineer at a Silicon Valley high-tech company, was investi-
gated for violating two national security statutes: (1) economic espio-
nage for misappropriating a trade secret from his former employer—
software used to simulate real world motion for military training and
other purposes—with the intent to benefit a foreign government, spe-
cifically the People’s Republic of China Navy Research Center;52 and
(2) for exporting source code for a visual simulation software pro-
gram used for training military fighter pilots, which was a defense arti-
cle on the United States Munitions List in violation of the Arms
Control Export Act.53 During the investigation, agents submitted a
preservation request on known email accounts that the defendant
used prior to his arrest. The preservation request saved any informa-
49. This article generally refers to Internet records or electronic evidence, which are
normally obtained under ECPA.
50. See United States v. Meng, No. CR 04-20216 JF (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2008); see also
Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Meng, CR 04-20216 JF (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13,
2006) (describing email deletions).
51. For more on the preservation request process under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), see infra
Part II.B.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
53. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2011).
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tion in the email account pending legal process; there, a search war-
rant for the contents of the communications and information stored
within the email account. Shortly after the defendant’s arrest in Flor-
ida became publicly known, someone using an Internet Protocol ad-
dress54 from the People’s Republic of China tried to delete virtually all
of the emails from his account while he was in custody.55 The effort to
delete the emails was thwarted by the timely preservation request. The
emails were subsequently obtained by a search warrant and used in
the investigation and prosecution of the case. Without these email
communications, the scope of the defendant’s conduct and activities
would have been less known. If law enforcement had first learned
about these accounts later, such as after his arrest, most likely any ef-
fort to preserve the emails would have been in vain given how quickly
someone acted to delete information in the account from another
country. Fortunately, because these records were preserved, the effort
to remove and destroy them was thwarted.
2. Unavailability of Records Results in Case Closure
In contrast, a case noted during congressional testimony shows
how a horrific crime remained unsolved when a provider no longer
retained account records. The crime involved an atrocious rape of a
two-year-old child that was videotaped and distributed on the Internet.
Investigators acted quickly in attempting to identify the responsible
54. Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique Internet Protocol
(“IP”) address by an Internet Service Provider. IP addresses consist of four numbers sepa-
rated by periods, such as: 12.34.567.789.
55. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 8, United States v. Meng, No. CR 04-
20216 JF (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2008). Investigators learned that someone deleted more than
900 e-mails from the defendant Meng’s Yahoo e-mail account. Id. In early December 2004,
defendant Meng’s e-mail account contained approximately 980 emails. Id. Between De-
cember 9, 2004 and January 2, 2005, defendant Meng was being held in custody by the
United States government and could not access his email account. Id. Between December
22, 2005 and January 2, 2005, someone utilizing IP addresses in China, accessed Meng’s
Yahoo email account and deleted approximately 966 emails. See Superseding Indictment at
¶ 37, United States v. Meng, CR 04-20216 JF (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2006) (describing email
deletions); Electronic Evidence In EEA Cases, supra note 18, at 47–48 (summarizing preserva-
tion of emails). The authors prosecuted the Meng case during their tenure in the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of California. Meng ultimately pled guilty to
committing economic espionage and violating the Arms Export Control Act. See Plea
Agreement, United States v. Meng, No. CR 04-20216 JF (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007) (as re-
dacted by the Court); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Chinese National Convicted
of Economic Espionage to Benefit China Navy Research Center (Aug. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_nsd_572.html; Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage (June 18, 2008), http://
www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-545.html.
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party. In pursuing the offense, an investigator determined that a video
of the incident was linked to a particular computer. An Internet Ser-
vice Provider (“ISP”) was contacted for the account information for
the computer. Regrettably, investigators were informed that the pro-
vider had not retained the customer records. There was nothing more
investigators could do and the crime remained unsolved without this
critical information.56 Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case.
Other comparable investigations have been closed once necessary In-
ternet records were unavailable for the ongoing investigation.57
Both of these examples involved criminal activity over the In-
ternet. In both instances, key evidence was initially maintained by
providers. In the first case, law enforcement was able to obtain infor-
mation retained in the account by a timely preservation request.58 Key
details concerning the charges were provided by email evidence that
would not have otherwise been available. In the second case, law en-
forcement acted as quickly as it could after receiving the Internet in-
56. Sexual Exploitation of Children Over the Internet: What Parents, Kids and Congress Need to
Know About Child Predators: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 285, 287 (2006) (statement of Mr. Flint
Waters, Lead Special Agent of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigations, Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
109hhrg30793/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg30793 .pdf; see also STAFF REPORT: SEXUAL EXPLOITA-
TION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET, supra note 20, at 19 (“When the ICAC agent ap-
proached the Internet Service Provider, Comcast, to request the customer information for
the IP address in Colorado, Comcast informed the agent that it had not retained the cus-
tomer records for that address. As of the date of the hearing, to Mr. Waters’ knowledge,
the child in the video had not been identified.”).
57. Similar problems have occurred in other child sexual exploitation cases. See Pro-
tecting Children From Internet Pornographers Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 1981 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
35– 36, 60 (2011) [hereinafter House Hearing: Protecting Children] (statement of Michael J.
Brown, Sheriff, Bedford County Sheriff’s Office, Retired), available at http://judici-
ary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-60_67309.pdf (law enforcement received a
cyber-tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in February 2011
involving “someone posting that they were exposing themselves to their 2-and-a-half-year-
old child”; the “only piece event evidence” was the Internet Protocol address in a chat
room; because the Internet Service Provider only retained the Internet Protocol history for
30 days, which had already passed, the case was closed; comparable case closures have
occurred “on a number of occasions”); Sexual Exploitation of Children Over the Internet: How
the State of New Jersey Is Combating Child Predators On The Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 34, 62
(2006) [hereinafter House Hearing: New Jersey Is Combating Child Predators On The Internet],
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg30531/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg305
31.pdf (noting that out of 110 investigative leads for possession and distribution of child
pornography over the Internet in Operation Guardian, only 39 targets were arrested be-
cause information was not retained by Internet Service Providers for the other leads).
58. As discussed in Part II.B, there are significant limitations to the preservation of
Internet records.
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vestigative lead. However, law enforcement ran into an investigative
dead end because the provider did not retain the requested identity
information. Since this information was no longer available, law en-
forcement was unable to identify the involved parties and the case was
closed.
3. Summary
The ability of law enforcement to obtain electronic records
turned on their availability from the provider. In both instances, law
enforcement acted promptly based on known information. The sole
difference was that in the first instance, the provider still had the
records. In the second, the provider did not. These examples illustrate
the race that law enforcement engages in when pursuing new leads
based on Internet records. Whether the records are available or not
will be unknown until legal process is served on the provider.
I. Significant Public Interests Impacted by the Availability of
Internet Records
Key public interests are affected by the availability of electronic
records to solve crime. Six key public policy objectives include: (1)
promoting confidence in the Internet; (2) addressing the legitimate
needs of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute crimes commit-
ted over the Internet; (3) addressing the rights and interests of crime
victims; (4) attaining the specific public policy objectives identified by
Congress in enacting a particular criminal statute; (5) provide a fair
process, ensuring that the responsible perpetrators are identified and
fairly prosecuted; and (6) balancing and respecting privacy interests.
A. Promoting Confidence in Using the Internet
The Internet is now an integral part of our social and economic
fabric. Many persons are nearly always connected to the Internet ei-
ther at work, home or in between through portable devices. E-com-
merce transactions are used to purchase nearly any item online. Next
year, e-commerce sales in the United States alone are expected to pass
$250 billion.59
59. D. Steven White & Godwin C. Ariguzo, A Time-Series Analysis of U.S. E-Commerce
Sales, 11 REV. BUS. RESEARCH 134, 139 (2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1940960 (“By 2013, it is predicted that U.S. e-commerce sales will
reach a level of $254.7 billion, for a growth in e-commerce sales of 52.94 percent from
2010.”).
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The Internet makes a significant contribution to the economy do-
mestically and around the world.60 The Internet has spawned new eco-
nomic opportunities.61 For example, the Internet promotes new
economic activity through lower transaction costs.62 Application devel-
opers find new ways and develop new tools to use on the Internet.
Mobile devices are now being used to conduct an increasing number
of online transactions.63 Small businesses use the Internet as a gateway
to reach customers with whom they may not otherwise be able to con-
nect. Indeed, for many, it is now difficult to imagine one day or a few
hours without connecting to the Internet in one form or another.
When Internet crimes remain unsolved or unaddressed, a loss of
confidence may result in the use of the Internet for e-commerce and
other Internet transactions and activities. For example, one interna-
tional report noted the impact of malware crimes on the confidence
of users of the Internet:
Society’s heavy reliance on information systems makes the conse-
quences of the failure or compromise of those systems potentially
serious. Malware is an effective and efficient means for attackers to
compromise large numbers of information systems, which cumula-
tively has the potential to undermine and erode society’s ability to
trust the integrity and confidentiality of information traversing
these systems. The failure to provide adequate protection for the
confidentiality and integrity of online transactions may have impli-
cations for governments, businesses and consumers. For example,
electronic government (e-government) services, such as online fil-
60. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 3 (2012) available at http://www.census.
gov/ econ/estats/2010/2010reportfinal.pdf (“From 2002 to 2010, retail e-sales increased
at an average annual growth rate of 17.9 percent, compared with 2.6 percent for total retail
sales.”); MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTIT., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S SWEEPING IMPACT ON
GROWTH, JOBS AND PROSPERITY (2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/features/~/
media/ 6BDDD3D756C449C1A9C41633EE5B0732.ashx (noting that “the Internet has
been a major driver to economic growth and is getting stronger”).
61. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Building Confidence: Electronic Commerce and Development, at 18, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/
Misc. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Building Confidence], available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
posdtem11.en.pdf (noting “the speed, range and accessibility of information on the In-
ternet and the low cost of distributing and capturing it create new commercial
possibilities”).
62. See, e.g., Building Confidence, supra note 61 (“[T]he Internet reduces transaction
costs and thus stimulates economic activity. A banking transaction via the Internet costs
one cent, compared with 27 cents at an ATM or 52 cents over the telephone. Processing an
airline ticket on the Internet costs $1, compared with $8 through a travel agent . . . .”).
63. See, e.g., Peter Eckert, Impact of Mobile Devices on Ecommerce, MOBILE COMMERCE
DAILY (July 17, 2012), http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/impact-of-mobile-devices-
on-ecommerce (predicting “that globally $119 billion in goods and services will be pur-
chased via a mobile phone in 2015, representing about 8 percent of the total ecommerce
market”).
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ing for taxes or benefits, are likely to include personal data that if
compromised could be used to commit fraud. Information systems
in small businesses or large public and private sector organisations
might be used to access such e-government or electronic com-
merce (e-commerce) services.64
A joint law enforcement report echoed this point concerning an
“erosion” of public confidence with regard to “phishing” schemes:
Phishing also undermines the public’s trust in the Internet. By
making consumers uncertain about the integrity of commercial
and financial websites, and even the Internet’s addressing system,
phishing can make them less likely to use the Internet for business
transactions. People who cannot trust where they are on the World
Wide Web are less likely to use it for legitimate commerce and
communications.65
Given the importance of the Internet globally and domestically,
the ability of law enforcement to obtain Internet records upon suffi-
cient legal process remains integral to the public policy interest in
maintaining confidence in the Internet.
B. “Legitimate Needs Of Law Enforcement”
Law enforcement is tasked with investigating and prosecuting
crimes. This objective cannot be met unless law enforcement has rea-
sonable means to investigate crimes committed over the Internet. An
important criminal justice objective is to ensure that law enforcement
has appropriate mechanisms to obtain key evidence and information
when it is needed. If essential Internet records are not available upon
a proper showing, then law enforcement simply may not be able to
complete its primary objectives. It is like asking law enforcement to be
successful without the means to do so.
In fact, by enacting ECPA, Congress initially recognized that the
“legitimate needs of law enforcement” is an essential public policy in-
terest.66 Not only does this objective continue, it is even more impor-
tant today. The Internet is used more frequently to commit crimes
today than when ECPA was enacted in 1986 and there are more ways
in which Internet crimes can be committed.
Given the limited retention of Internet records, normally law en-
forcement is racing to obtain this evidence as investigative leads are
provided. The process of identifying, preserving, requesting, and ob-
64. MALWARE REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
65. REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 11 (footnote omitted). For a definition of
“phishing,” see supra note 13.
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
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taining Internet evidence entails many steps.67 Delays in the process
hamper the ability of law enforcement to enforce the law. Since time
is of the essence, even one day can make all the difference to whether
the necessary evidence to solve the crime may be obtained.
C. Crime Victims’ Rights and Interests
Another public policy interest identified by Congress is serving
the needs of crime victims in the criminal justice process. Crime vic-
tims turn to law enforcement to investigate the offense, seek justice
through the criminal justice process, and to obtain restitution or be
made whole to the extent possible.68 Significant victims’ rights statutes
provide important protections once the criminal justice process has
commenced.69
Generally, since enactment of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,
crime victims are “full participants in the criminal justice system.”70
Crime victims have eight specific statutory rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused;
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any
public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the
crime or of any release or escape of the accused;
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court pro-
ceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evi-
dence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially
altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding;
67. The steps are described infra Part II.C.
68. Restitution is mandatory in many criminal cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (2006) (or-
der of restitution); see generally id. § 3663A (mandatory restitution to victims of certain
crimes); id. § 3663 (order of restitution); id. § 3664 (procedure for issuance and enforce-
ment of order of restitution); id. § 3771(a) (noting restitution right). Restitution may also
be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release. See id. § 3563(b)(2) (proba-
tion condition); id. § 3583(d) (supervised release condition).
69. See generally Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10607 (2006) (services
for victims); Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771; 18 U.S.C. § 3510
(rights of victims to attend and observe trial). The Department of Justice has implemented
Procedures to Promote Compliance with Crime Victims’ Rights Obligations as well. See 28
C.F.R. § 45.10 (2011).
70. Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (grant-
ing a petition for writ of mandamus and holding that the district court erred by refusing to
permit crime victims to speak at a sentencing hearing, while noting that “[l]imiting victims
to written impact statements, while allowing the prosecutor and the defendant the oppor-
tunity to address the court, would treat victims as secondary participants in the sentencing
process. The CVRA clearly meant to make victims full participants”); see also In re Stewart,
552 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (after district court denied victims’
request to be heard before a plea hearing, granting petition for a writ of mandamus and
ordering the district court “to recognize petitioners as victims and afford them the rights of
victims under the CVRA”).
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(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding;
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Gov-
ernment in the case;
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; and
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and respect while preserv-
ing the dignity and privacy of the victim.71
However, for Internet-based offenses, if key electronic evidence is
not available, the crime may be unsolvable and no charges may be
filed. In such instances, crime victims may never have an opportunity
to seek redress in the criminal justice process.72 None of the foregoing
rights will apply. There will only be a victim without justice and the
right to be “reasonably heard” in the criminal justice process.
Electronic evidence may also be necessary to identify other crime
victims. This evidence may reveal that the scope and impact of the
offense is broader than originally anticipated when the investigation
commenced. It is not uncommon that as the investigation begins only
one or a few victims are known. As the investigation progresses, inves-
tigators may learn that multiple people may have been victimized by
the same scheme or offense. An accurate accounting of victims may be
necessary to properly determine restitution and attain the congres-
sional objective promoting restitution.
The ability of law enforcement to obtain necessary Internet
records is therefore central to advancing and attaining the policy
objectives recognized by Congress to vindicate the rights of victims.
Without crucial evidence available only from providers, Internet crime
victims may never see the criminal justice process remedy their
wrongs.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).
72. Courts have noted that the Crime Victims’ Rights Act “does not confer any rights
upon a victim until a prosecution is already begun.” United States v. Merkosky, No. 1:02CR-
0168-01, 2008 WL 1744762, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2008); see also United States v. Rubin,
558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the rights of crime victims did not
commence until charges were filed which triggered “covered status under the CVRA”);
The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 35
Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2010/availability-crime-vic-
tims-rights.pdf (“In our view, the better reading of the Act—considering its text, structure,
purpose, and legislative history—is that the rights provided by the CVRA are guaranteed
only from the time criminal proceedings are initiated through a complaint, information,
or indictment.”).
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D. Public Policy Objectives for Specific Criminal Statutes
Many statutes are enacted by Congress to advance specific and
unique objectives. In doing so, Congress has already determined that
certain public policy interests are important. For every statute, Con-
gress makes a public policy decision concerning the societal impor-
tance of redressing certain crimes by the fact that the statutes are
enacted. The legislative objectives for the specific offenses may be
frustrated without important electronic evidence. A few examples are
considered.
1. Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) of 1996 was enacted to
promote and protect national economic security.73 As noted in the
House Report:
With this legislation, Congress will extend vital federal protection
to another form of proprietary economic information — trade
secrets. There can be no question that the development of proprie-
tary economic information is an integral part of America’s eco-
nomic well-being. Moreover, the nation’s economic interests are a
part of its national security interests. Thus, threats to the nation’s
economic interest are threats to the nation’s vital security
interests.74
In signing the legislation into law, President William Clinton
noted the statute’s necessity to protect trade secrets which “are an in-
tegral part of virtually every sector of our economy and are essential to
maintaining the health and competitiveness of critical industries oper-
ating in the United States.”75 If the trade secret or economic espio-
nage offense was committed in part over the Internet, and these
electronic records are not available, the ability to investigate and pros-
73. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831–1839).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996); see also Economic Espionage: Hearing Before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13–14
(1996) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (noting the
inability of existing law to counter state-sponsored targeting of “persons, firms, and indus-
tries in the United States and the U.S. Government itself, to steal or wrongfully obtain
critical technologies, data, and information in order to provide their own industrial sectors
with a competitive advantage” and that “[c]losing these gaps requires a federal statute to
specifically proscribe the various acts defined under economic espionage and to address
the national security aspects of this crime”).
75. Presidential Statement on Signing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 3 PUB.
PAPERS 2040 (Oct. 11, 1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (noting that “the develop-
ment of proprietary economic information is an integral part of America’s economic well-
being” and “threats to the nation’s economic interest are threats to the nation’s vital secur-
ity interests”).
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ecute the offense may be thwarted. Many of these cases have been
shown to involve email and Internet communications.76 The congres-
sional objective to promote and protect national economic security is
undermined absent effective law enforcement means to secure critical
online information.
2. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004
As another example, Congress sought to curb “the growing prob-
lem of identity theft” by providing for enhanced penalties in the Iden-
tity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004.77 This policy objective is
undermined by the inability of law enforcement to obtain electronic
evidence particularly since the Internet is a common forum to commit
identity theft. Higher penalties cannot be levied if the perpetrators
are not identified and held accountable in the criminal justice process
in the first instance.
3. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977
In a third example, Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,78 to address “a deep and
abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and youth
of the United States” and “to protect and benefit such children.”79
The Senate Report described the exploitation as a unique “form of
child abuse” which “may permanently traumatize and warp the minds
of the children involved.”80 The children are often impacted for many
years. “Such encounters cannot help but have a deep psychological,
humiliating impact on these youngsters and jeopardize the possibility
of healthy, affectionate relationships in the future.”81
We do not need to hypothesize about what might happen when
law enforcement is unable to obtain Internet records related to the
76. See Electronic Evidence In EEA Cases, supra note 18, at 43–46 (providing examples of
electronic evidence used in trade secret and economic espionage cases).
77. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, and the Identity Theft Investigation and Prosecu-
tion Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1731 and H.R. 3693 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2004), available at
http:// judiciary.house.gov/legacy/92671.pdf; see also Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1028A).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982)).
79. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Inves-
tigate Juvenile Delinquency of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 6 (1977), available at
http:// ia600309.us.archive.org/24/items/protectionofchil00unit/protectionofchil00unit.
pdf.
80. Id. at 41, 47, 48, 52.
81. Id. at 46.
316 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
sexual exploitation of children on the Internet. Tragically, we already
have several concrete examples of how open investigations must be
closed when this electronic evidence is not available.82 During con-
gressional hearings, Congress has been told on at least three occasions
that if the necessary Internet records had been retained, further inves-
tigation could have been pursued. Perhaps these open cases may have
been solved. Because necessary Internet records were unavailable, all
that is left is a scarred and traumatized child without redress in the
criminal justice process. When this occurs, the objectives of Congress
in enacting the original Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act, as amended over the years, are thwarted by the unavail-
ability of key Internet evidence.
4. Summary
These are only a few illustrations of the objectives noted in crimi-
nal statutes. Each congressional statute has a unique public policy pur-
pose that it seeks to address. When the crime remains unsolved as a
result of the unavailability of Internet records, these congressionally
identified objectives are frustrated.
E. Due Process Interests: Identifying the Right Perpetrator and
Providing a Fair Trial
The criminal justice process also advances important due process
interests for the accused. This includes the objectives to identify the
correct perpetrator(s) and to provide a fair trial.
Electronic evidence can be used to support guilt or innocence.
For example, in some cases the defendant has used the accounts of
others or tried to set up another individual to make it appear that he
was involved.83 The initial leads in these cases suggest that the person
82. For specific examples, see supra notes 55–56.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 231 F. 3d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 2000) (af-
firming hacking trial conviction and describing how the disgruntled computer administra-
tor defendant accessed the company’s network after he quit his position and “used a
computer program called ‘Switch User’ to switch his account to that of a [company recep-
tionist which allowed him] to take advantage of the benefits and privileges associated with
that employee’s account, such as creating and deleting accounts and adding features to
existing accounts”); United States v. Ardolf, No. 10-159, 2010 WL 3604099 (D. Minn. Aug.
13, 2010). In Ardolf, the defendant tried to set up his neighbor by using his neighbor’s
wireless Internet account. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Att’ys Office, Dist.
Minn., Blaine Man Sentenced for Hacking into Neighbor’s Internet System to Email
Threats Against the Vice President, Among Other Crimes (July 12, 2011). The defendant
admitted hacking into the account, creating email accounts in his neighbor’s name, and
using one account to send threatening communications to the Vice President of the
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being set up was involved in the crime under investigation. The In-
ternet records, if available, can be used to determine how the offense
was committed and who was behind it. In this way, the Internet
records promote the criminal justice objectives of ensuring that the
right perpetrator is identified and held to account. Without necessary
records, a full understanding of how the crime was committed over
the Internet may remain unknown. The trail of Internet evidence
often provides an explanation or understanding for other gaps in the
evidence. In this manner, the ultimate criminal justice interest in en-
suring a fair trial is promoted.
F. Balancing and Respecting Privacy Interests
As originally enacted, ECPA recognized the public policy interest
in “the privacy expectations of citizens.”84 These privacy interests re-
main important today but should be appropriately balanced against
other significant public policy interests, specifically law enforcement
and victims’ rights interests.
Privacy concerns can be balanced in a number of respects. First,
the legal process considers privacy concerns when law enforcement
seeks to obtain the requested information. No records are provided
unless proper legal process is submitted. Legislative and other propos-
als to retain electronic records recommend that pre-existing records
be retained for a longer period.85 Providers are not compelled to cre-
ate new records,86 they have already determined that these records
serve their business purposes. These pre-existing records are not relin-
United States and other officials. Id. The defendant “admittedly sent the email using the
neighbor’s wireless router, his intent being to have the email traced back to the neighbor.”
Id. He also “posed as his neighbor and used the email accounts he had created to send
emails of a sexual nature to three of the neighbor’s co-workers” using “the neighbor’s
wireless Internet connection, intending for them to be traced back to the neighbor.” Id.
He “attached an image containing child pornography” to one email message, and “created
a MySpace page in the neighbor’s name, on which he posted the same image of child
pornography.” Id. Defendant was sentenced to 216 months in prison following his plea
agreement conviction based on two counts of aggravated identity theft, one count of distri-
bution of child pornography, one count of possession of child pornography, one count of
unauthorized access to a protected computer, and one count of making threats to the
President and successors to the presidency. Id.
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
85. Recent legislative proposals are considered below. See infra Part IV.C.
86. See, e.g., House Hearings: Data Retention As a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes,
supra note 27, at 50 (addressing privacy concerns noting that much of the data is already
presently being retained by providers and that “[a] mandatory data retention requirement
would only extend that retention time to make sure that it was applied universally across
industry” and available for law enforcement).
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quished to law enforcement unless sufficient legal process is obtained.
The retention of electronic communications is merely preserved
pending legal process. The balance of privacy interests against the “le-
gitimate needs of law enforcement” is struck by the inability to obtain
any records absent sufficient legal process.87 As noted, the preserva-
tion process under Section 2703(f) works well but has significant limi-
tations.88 If the records are not present at the time law enforcement
learns about them and requests them, the legitimate needs of law en-
forcement cannot be met.
Second, privacy concerns are considered by the legal standard re-
quired to obtain electronic records—depending on the nature of the
records. The standard for obtaining records under the current law is
higher when the contents of communications are requested. Under
ECPA, a search warrant is generally required to obtain the “contents
of a wire or electronic communication.”89 Lesser standards are used
for transactional and other records that do not involve the contents of
communications.90 As the Supreme Court has recognized, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in records that are voluntarily given
to third parties such as subscriber information or transactional
records.91 In following the trail of evidence on the Internet, law en-
forcement is largely seeking records that the defendant voluntarily
conveyed to third party Internet providers during the commission of
the crime.
Third, privacy concerns have been sufficiently addressed with re-
gard to the retention of other records in which mandatory retention
standards apply. For example, health, employment, banking and
other records must satisfy retention periods ranging from one to ten
87. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16, 19.
88. For a discussion of the preservation process and limitations, see infra Part II.B.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
90. For a summary of these standards, see infra note 99.
91. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (holding there was no “legiti-
mate ‘expectation of privacy’” under the Fourth Amendment in bank records which were
“voluntarily conveyed to . . . banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business” and were not his “private papers”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744
(1979) (applying Miller and holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
dialed telephone numbers obtained from the phone company). In Smith the Court noted
that “[w]hen [petitioner] used his phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical informa-
tion to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.” Id. Since there is no Fourth Amendment
right in records voluntarily conveyed to third parties, Congress can weigh the balance of
interests and determine the circumstances in which law enforcement can access these
records in a manner that does not undermine law enforcement objectives.
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years, depending on the records.92 Many of these records are now
maintained in electronic form. The sufficient safekeeping of these
types of records, many of which include the most private of informa-
tion, shows that privacy issues can be respected and satisfied.
Fourth, the privacy interests of a customer of a particular account
served by a provider have already been breached when the customer
becomes a crime victim.93 In this situation, the account holder will
usually turn to law enforcement for assistance. As already noted,
whether the victim will obtain justice, restitution, and other crime vic-
tim rights, will turn on the ability of law enforcement to investigate
and solve the crime by obtaining records establishing who committed
the crime.
Finally, in retaining the data, steps can be taken to ensure that it
is sufficiently safeguarded. Because data must be searchable, it cannot
be encrypted. Nevertheless, other steps can be taken to safeguard it.
For example, many providers do not allow access to these records
from within the company unless there is a business reason for the ac-
cess. Further, law enforcement will not be able to obtain the records
absent a sufficient showing.
In sum, concerns about privacy interests remain important. They
can be addressed by the manner and circumstances in which law en-
forcement may request and obtain the records.
II. Key Challenges in Obtaining Fleeting Electronic Evidence
While electronic records may be essential to solving Internet-
based crimes and advancing the several public policy interests noted
above, law enforcement confronts a host of challenges in obtaining
this critical and time sensitive evidence. Insufficient retention polices
compound the problem created by electronic evidence’s ephemeral
nature. Because electronic evidence is typically only available for a
very limited period, delays in learning about the account or in ob-
taining an investigative lead are inherent in the process.
92. For a discussion of some of the retention records, see infra notes 94–98 and ac-
companying text.
93. The commission of the crime on the Internet may cause an invasion of privacy for
the crime victim. As Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Mueller has noted on this
point, “[w]henever an intruder opens a door to our networks, there is a clear risk to indi-
vidual privacy and intellectual property—not to mention economic and national security.”
Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the Commonwealth
Club of California (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/cloak-
and-dagger-in-the-virtual-world-the-fbi2019s-fight-against-cyber-threats.
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A. Limited Period of Availability Based on Retention Period
In following the trail of Internet evidence, there are many elec-
tronic records that are created that may be relevant to investigating
the offense. Most Internet records are available for only a limited pe-
riod. Their availability turns on how long a provider retains the
records. There is no uniform period of retention. Different types of
records have different retention periods.94 Each provider determines
what and how records are maintained based on their unique business
needs.95
For example, text message content is typically retained for only a
few days. Log records, which record commands and other informa-
tion transmitted through the Internet and may reveal Internet activity
by a user, also are usually maintained for only a few days.96 Subscriber
information and method of payment for the account may be held for
a longer period.97
There is also a lack of uniformity in how the same or similar
records may be maintained by different providers. Records that may
be retained by one provider for one week may be retained by a differ-
ent provider for only a few days. For example, text messages normally
are retained, if at all, for a short period, typically a few days or a week.
If text communications by customer A using provider A are sent and
94. The different retention periods have also been noted during congressional hear-
ings. See, e.g., Making The Internet Safe For Kids: The Role Of ISP’s And Social Networking Sites:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) [hereinafter House Hearings: Making the Internet Safe]
(statement of Rep. Michael C. Burgess), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/
pagedetails.action?st=search+algorithms&granuleId=CHRG-109hhrg30530&packageId=
CHRG-109hhrg30530&bread=true (“While some of the providers, like EarthLink, retain
data for 7 years, others retain the IPs for as little as 31 days.”); id. at 96, 144–45, 149, 281
(noting that IP addresses are retained for 180 days by Comcast, seven years by Earthlink, 90
days by AOL, nine months by Verizon, and 90 days by MySpace.com); STAFF REPORT: SEX-
UAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET, supra note 20, at 22 (noting during
congressional hearings that “the data retention policies of the ISPs that testified at the
hearing vary widely, from 60 days to seven years”); Electronic Evidence In EEA Cases, supra
note 18, at 47 (providing examples of retention periods for different types of records).
95. If one provider elects to retain more records than another provider for its own
business reasons, upon sufficient legal process law enforcement should be able to access
these preexisting records, which may prove essential to solving the crime.
96. For more background on the use of log records in criminal investigations, see
Using Log Record Analysis, supra note 36.
97. The Stored Communications Act provides for disclosure to law enforcement cus-
tomer or subscriber information including name, address, telephone connection records,
or records of session times and durations, length of service, types of service utilized, sub-
scriber identity, and means and source of payment for services rendered. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(2) (2006).
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received by customer B using provider B, the ability for law enforce-
ment to obtain these communications may turn on which provider
retains them longer. If the crime is reported after the retention pe-
riod, these records cannot be obtained from either provider.
B. The Preservation of Records, While Useful, Has Significant
Limitations
ECPA has an important preservation provision under Section
2703(f),98 which provides an important tool for law enforcement.
Upon a preservation request by law enforcement, a provider will
freeze or take a “snapshot” of available electronic records in the ac-
count which is held pending legal process (such as a search warrant,
court order or subpoena).99
For example, if an investigator learns of an Internet account
(such as an email account or Internet Protocol address),100 a preserva-
tion request is sent to the email provider and held for 90 days until
legal process is obtained and submitted to the provider. The 90 day
preservation can be extended once more for an additional 90 days. A
search warrant will be prepared and submitted to a judge if the con-
tents of the account are sought.101 Once the search warrant is signed
98. The preservation provision provides:
(1) In general. — A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a
remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take
all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pend-
ing the issuance of a court order or other process.
(2) Period of retention. — Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be re-
tained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day
period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(f).
99. Legal process may include: (1) a search warrant based on probable cause under
the Fourth Amendment and issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) for the content of electronic
or wire communications maintained by a provider; (2) a court order under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) based on “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion” that provides for subscriber and customer account information and other non-con-
tent records concerning an account, such as transactional logs; (3) a subpoena under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) to obtain subscriber and customer account information; and (4) a pen
register or trap and trace order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 for records of outgoing and
incoming telephone or electronic communications to a particular number or account.
100. An Internet Protocol address is assigned by an Internet service provider and is
used to access the Internet. The IP address is comparable to a telephone number assigned
to a particular house or place.
101. A search warrant may be submitted for “the contents of a wire or electronic com-
munication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more
than one hundred and eighty days or less . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
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by the judge, it will be submitted to the provider. The provider will
comply with the legal process and collect the records within the scope
of the search warrant. The information, which can take some time to
gather, will then be provided to law enforcement. The information
may provide new leads about previously unknown accounts. New pres-
ervation requests may be issued on these new leads. A new round to
obtain legal process commences on the new leads.
1. Limited to Preservation or “Snapshot” of Information Pending
at the Time of the Request
There are two significant limitations to preservation requests.
First, preservation is limited to what remains in the account at the
time of the preservation request. Even if the account is known or later
becomes known, it is helpful if the data is present at the time of the
request for preservation but often it is not. There is often a substantial
gap between the time that a record is created and retained by a pro-
vider and the time that law enforcement may first learn about it and
request preservation. A preservation request for an account that is
empty or in which key communications have been removed will yield
no substantive results for the investigation.
Timing is therefore dispositive. Because of varying retention peri-
ods, the availability of Internet-based records largely turns on time.
One day can make a difference in obtaining the evidence. However,
the longer the retention period, the greater the chance that key elec-
tronic records will be available pending law enforcement process.
2. The “Electronic Evidence Lapse” Problem
The second challenge results from the lapse of electronic evi-
dence that invariably become known as the investigation develops.
The limited retention of records creates a race to identify all relevant
electronic evidence leads. However, by the time that law enforcement
learns about subsequent leads, those newly identified electronic
records may no longer be available if the retention period has already
passed by the time they were discovered.
It is not uncommon that one Internet lead may result in the dis-
covery of other accounts and Internet evidence. If the originally pre-
served records contain new leads, one question will be whether
information in these newly identified accounts will be available by the
time law enforcement learns of these leads and legal process is submit-
ted for these new accounts and the information is received. The lapse
of these records may make a difference in the investigation.
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This is important because new leads are often generated as elec-
tronic evidence is obtained pursuant to legal process. An initial pres-
ervation and request for Internet records often highlights new
Internet records, resulting in a second preservation and request,
which may lead to a third preservation and request, and so on. For
example, an account may not become known until further electronic
evidence is uncovered after pursuing numerous leads over several
months. Later in the investigation, information about new accounts
may surface. However, due to limited retention periods, the records
for the second or third or later request may no longer be available at
the time law enforcement first learns about them. The longer the in-
formation is retained pending legal process the more likely it may be
available for law enforcement purposes upon its discovery.
In law enforcement’s race to obtain Internet records, timing may
determine whether these records are still retained at the time law en-
forcement first learns of their relevance to the investigation. This
“electronic evidence lapse” may impact whether the crime can be
solved.102
C. Under ECPA, There Are Many Steps in the Investigative
Process to Obtain Electronic Records
The process of identifying, preserving, requesting, and obtaining
Internet evidence through the legal process is often not fully appreci-
ated or understood. Given the limited retention periods for many In-
ternet records, an investigator is typically engaged in a race to obtain
this electronic evidence once it is identified while concurrently jug-
gling other matters on the investigation or on other cases.
Delay is an inherent part of the investigative process. Pursuing
investigative leads and obtaining relevant information can take many
months.103 Requesting ECPA records is only one part of the investiga-
tive process which may include interviewing victims and witnesses, fol-
lowing financial leads, requesting and obtaining a search warrant for a
business or residence, among many other steps.104
102. For further examples of the “electronic evidence lapse” problem, see supra Part
II.B.
103. For example, as one congressional report noted, “[c]hild pornography investiga-
tions often take months to develop, during which time critical data, such as IP addresses
linked to a subscriber’s account, may be lost if the Internet Service Provider does not have
an adequate retention policy.” STAFF REPORT: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER
THE INTERNET, supra note 20, at 4.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (court af-
firmed conviction for a computer intrusion that was traced by a system administrator from
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The process involves about ten discrete steps, as summarized be-
low. In some cases, many of these steps may not consume much time.
However, delay, which can occur at any step, may impact whether es-
sential electronic records may be obtained for the investigation. The
following review summarizes the key steps in the investigative process
that law enforcement confronts in requesting initial records under
ECPA.
1. Step One: Crime Reported; Investigation Opened; Initial
Electronic Evidence Identified
An investigation commences upon the report of the crime. In
opening the investigation, investigators may identify, or the crime vic-
tim may provide, initial information that confirms the existence of
some Internet evidence that may relate to the crime. For example, the
victim may provide an email account that was used in a fraud scheme
or some communication that reveals an Internet Protocol address. In-
vestigators will follow-up on this initial lead along with any others.
Delay Factors: Initially, a number of delay factors may affect
whether law enforcement can obtain any electronic records based on
the early identification of Internet evidence. For example, a fair
amount of time may have passed between the time the crime occurred
and was reported. Perhaps the victim originally did not realize that a
crime had taken place. Since most records of Internet activity are
available for a limited period, the longer the passage of time, the less
likely the provider may have retained the records. If this is the only
evidence law enforcement has to investigate the crime, the availability
of it may be critical to identifying the perpetrator and/or solving the
crime.105 At this early juncture of the investigation, the availability of
the electronic evidence remains unknown pending further legal pro-
cess and receipt of the requested information from the provider.
one company to a university and then turned over to law enforcement. The defendant
hacked into a computer system of Qualcomm Corporation in San Diego from computers at
the University of Wisconsin).
105. For example, text messages, which are normally only retained for a couple of days
at most, proved critical to solving a murder. See House Hearings: Data Retention As a Tool for
Investigating Internet Crimes, supra note 27, at 16–17, 20–21 (statement of John M. Douglass,
Chief Of Police, Overland Park, KS; Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia)
(the unexpected preservation of text messages from the defendant’s cell phone carrier
along with other cell tower data turned out to be “the single most important piece of
evidence in linking the defendant to the” murders of a 22-year old and her 10-month old
son). In contrast, the unavailability of initial Internet evidence in other cases required
closing the investigations. See supra Part Intro.C.2.
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2. Step Two: Preservation Request Issued Under Section 2703(f)
Step two requires law enforcement to make a request under sec-
tion 2703(f) to preserve information from the Internet evidence lead.
This evidence may include, for example, an email address or an ac-
count connected to a particular Internet Protocol address.106
Before submitting the preservation request, the investigator will
need to know where to send the request. This will involve identifying
the provider maintaining the particular account. For example, the in-
vestigator may need to determine which provider is assigned the In-
ternet Protocol address. Several initial questions may arise: Is it a
common provider or one that is not well known, such as a provider
furnishing proxy services?107 Is the Internet Protocol address hosted
in the United States or another country?108 Once the provider for the
account is identified, the preservation request will be sent and the in-
formation in the account will be preserved for 90 days pending receipt
of legal process (with a possible extension for another 90 days).109
Frankly, this example is simplistic in that only one Internet evi-
dence lead is being pursued. More commonly, for crimes committed
over the Internet, multiple Internet leads may be available. For exam-
ple, there may be multiple Internet Protocol addresses or email ac-
counts that have been identified early in the investigation. A similar
process to identify the host of the account and submit a preservation
request must be made for each lead.
Some cases involve multiple victims. Each victim may have initial
electronic evidence leads that need to be separately pursued following
the same process. Investigators may need to review this evidence to
determine whether the same perpetrator was involved or whether
there are common threads.
Delay Factors: Initially, it may take law enforcement some time to
identify the provider of the account. For example, law enforcement
may need to determine which provider services the Internet Protocol
address. If the address is from another country, a request will need to
be made to law enforcement officials abroad.
A race is underway to preserve available account information.
Whether any relevant information is in the account will not be known
106. For more on the preservation request process under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), see supra
Part II.B.
107. For a description of proxy services see infra note 121.
108. For information on obtaining evidence in other countries, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 130–36.
109. For a discussion concerning a preservation extension see supra note 98.
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until legal process is prepared, submitted and the results are received.
As already noted,110 the mere request to preserve Internet records
does not ensure they will be available. In some cases, even with a pres-
ervation request issued as soon as law enforcement learns about the
account, no account records were available at the time of the request,
requiring the case to be closed.111
If some time has passed before the crime was reported, there may
be no relevant information remaining in the account at the time of
the preservation request. If the perpetrator learns of the investigation,
he or she may take steps to remove or delete the information. If this
occurs before a preservation request can be submitted, there may be
nothing left in the account after legal process is served. If so, this in-
vestigative lead and the time taken to pursue it will not yield meaning-
ful investigative results to advance the investigation.
3. Step Three: Legal Process Prepared
With the preservation request submitted, law enforcement will
begin preparing legal process. For example, for the content in the
account, a search warrant may be prepared.112 The investigator will
want to take care to confirm the accuracy of the details in the affidavit
before it is submitted to a judge.113 This verification process will de-
pend on the confirmation of other facts, either through witnesses or
other records.
Probable cause is measured under the “totality of the circum-
stances.”114 The initial Internet lead (email address or Internet Proto-
col address) may be insufficient by itself to show probable cause. More
likely, the agent will seek to include other information from the inves-
tigation to show probable cause. Additional information required for
the affidavit may be pending other legal process. For example, the
agent may be waiting for information about financial records in a fi-
nancial crime that may be relevant or significant for the affidavit.
Bank records can take several weeks to obtain from a financial institu-
110. See supra Part Intro.C.2.
111. Id. While this has occurred in a number of cases involving child pornography, see
supra notes 55–56, the same principle applies to other crimes. If records for a key lead
involving Internet evidence are unavailable, there may be no option but to close the case.
112. For more information, see supra note 99. Other process may include: a search
warrant, court order, pen register or trap and trace order, or subpoena. Id.
113. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (a search’s validity may be challenged
if there are any material misstatements or omissions in the search warrant affidavit).
114. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (adopting “totality of the cir-
cumstances” standard).
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tion. The initial preservation request retains the information in the
account, if any, for 90 days. However, given the need to obtain other
information in the investigation and attend to other matters, the stat-
ute recognizes that an additional 90 days may be required to extend
the initial preservation request.
During the preparation of legal process, the agent may seek gui-
dance from the prosecutor to address legal or other issues in the case.
Most prosecuting offices require that the prosecutor review the legal
process before it is submitted to the court. Busy prosecutors will
schedule time to address any issues and review the sufficiency of the
legal process.
In preparing legal process, the time of the investigator will be
divided among multiple demands and priorities. Concurrently, the in-
vestigator will be pursuing other leads in the case, such as interviewing
other witnesses and pursuing financial records. The investigator will
also be attending to other cases at the same time.
While the initial Internet lead has been preserved, significant new
key leads may no longer be available by the time law enforcement
learns of them. At this juncture, it remains unknown whether there
will be an electronic evidence lapse for new leads.115 This information
will not be known until legal process is served and the results are
returned.
Delay Factors: As noted, sufficient time will be needed to prepare
the necessary legal process, including obtaining additional informa-
tion, verifying the accuracy of information for an affidavit, or address-
ing legal issues with the prosecutor. The agent may be waiting for
other information, such as bank records, before the affidavit can be
completed. The time to prepare the legal process will depend on the
circumstances of each case. Legal or other issues may need to be ad-
dressed with the prosecutor.
4. Step Four: Legal Process Submitted for Initial Review
After the legal process is completed, the agent submits the appli-
cation for legal process to the court for initial review. Many federal
judges, who are juggling time in court with other cases and demands,
prefer to have a day or so to review the search warrant affidavit. If a
judge is in trial or the middle of extended proceedings, the agent will
typically drop off the legal process that will wait for the judge to review
during a break or at the end of the day. The agent may be told to
115. For a discussion of the “electronic evidence lapse” problem see supra Part II.B.2.
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return later in the day or the next day or so. Some courts today will
accept the draft application by email. In some rural areas, the judge
may not be readily available, as there may not be a full-time judge or
the judge may be holding court in another part of the district.
During the period of initial review, the judge may have questions
about the application for legal process. Modifications to the applica-
tion may be required. Another day or so may be taken to confirm
necessary information and prepare an updated affidavit or application
to address the judge’s questions.
Delay Factors: Even busy and hard-working courts considering
many cases need time to review the final affidavit. Submitting the ap-
plication or affidavit for judicial review can take a day or a couple of
days or more.116 Additional time may be spent responding to ques-
tions from the judge who may see issues that were not noted before.
Modifications to the affidavit may be required, which will then be re-
submitted for review. Where one day can make a difference, any delay
can be consequential. Time is ticking on the availability of the fleeting
electronic records for other accounts yet to be revealed during the
ongoing investigation.
5. Step Five: Legal Process Formally Submitted to the Court
After the court has completed its initial review, if changes are re-
quired, a new affidavit must be submitted. The court will review the
affidavit again.
If no questions arose during the initial review or no modifications
were required, the investigator will be told to come to chambers. If
the judge is in court proceedings, the investigator may wait at the
courthouse until advised that the judge is ready to meet. For example,
the investigator may wait until the judge comes off the bench on an-
other matter. If the judge is in trial, the agent may be told to come at
the end of the day or the next day during a break in the proceedings.
Delay Factors: Once the application is initially reviewed and ready
to be completed, the agent will typically schedule an appointment or
wait to meet with the judge. Where one day can make a difference,
any delay can be consequential. Time keeps ticking on the availability
of the fleeting electronic records for other accounts yet to be revealed
during the ongoing investigation.
116. Steps four, five and six can occur on the same day or can take a couple of days or
more, depending on the circumstances of the case and the availability of the judge. Busy
judges have many priorities and cases that must be juggled concurrently.
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6. Step Six: Legal Process Approved; Satisfaction of Oath
Requirement
After being told to come to court, an agent will meet with the
judge, normally in chambers. An application for a court order or
search warrant is formally completed before the court. For example,
normally for a search warrant, the affiant will swear under oath that
the facts in the affidavit are accurate.117 Once the application for a
court order or search warrant is approved by the judge, it is normally
filed under seal in the clerk’s office.
Delay Factors: Normally an appointment is scheduled to meet per-
sonally with the judge who may be in court or attending to other cases
and matters. In some larger western districts, investigators may need
to drive several hours to get to the judge’s chambers. Swearing a war-
rant can therefore take all day.
7. Step Seven: Legal Process Served or Executed on the Provider of
the Account
Law enforcement serves or executes the legal process on the pro-
vider.118 The provider then collects the information within the scope
of the legal process (for example, if the search warrant approves com-
munications during a particular period of time).
Delay Factor: Collection and provision of the information to law
enforcement can range from about a week to a few weeks or even
more. It remains to be seen whether any information remains in the
account as requested at the time of preservation. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, time is ticking on the availability of electronic records for other
accounts yet to be revealed during the ongoing investigation. By the
time the information is received on the initial application, the reten-
tion period may have passed for new accounts that are identified later
in the investigation.
117. While the search warrant will be submitted under ECPA, it will be prepared “using
the [standard search warrant] procedures” under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). The oath requirement is imposed by Rule
41(d)(2). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2).
118. Unlike a traditional search warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 3105, the investigator need
not be present at the provider to serve or execute the ECPA search warrant. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(g). Fax service is permitted. Id.
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8. Step Eight: Provider Gives Information to Law Enforcement
After Collecting Information Within the Scope of the
Legal Process
Law enforcement receives the information from the provider.
Questions may arise about the manner in which the provider main-
tains the records it provided. For example, questions may concern
how the records provided are maintained or created including what
events are memorialized. Records for providers often vary and record
different events.
Delay Factors: Calls may be needed to the provider to address ques-
tions about the records.
9. Step Nine: Law Enforcement Review of Information
The information may be extensive or voluminous and may take
some time for the investigator to review. The investigator may be able
to corroborate the Internet records with other evidence obtained in
the investigation, such as with financial records or witness interviews.
New leads may result from the information, including the identifica-
tion of new witness or accounts.
Delay Factors: Depending on how much information is provided,
the investigator may need a fair amount of time to review and assess
the information (the larger the amount of data that is provided, the
larger amount of time to review it). The investigator may also learn
that some records in the account were deleted or removed, which may
require further questions be asked of the provider.
10. Step Ten: Pursue Investigation and Identify New Leads Based
on Information Received from the Provider in Step (9)
The information from the provider may confirm who the primary
perpetrators were or show that others were involved or more culpable.
New evidence leads may also be identified, such as the use of other
email accounts or Internet Protocol addresses.
On the new leads, it will remain to be seen whether the investiga-
tors will confront the electronic evidence lapse problem.119 The inves-
tigator will have to pursue the same steps described above for the new
leads. If a sufficient amount of time has passed since the original In-
ternet evidence lead, requests to preserve the new Internet evidence
leads may be too late to protect the evidence.
119. For a discussion of the “electronic evidence lapse” problem see supra Part II.B.2.
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Delay Factors: New accounts and leads may have been created
around the time of the incident but, due to the passage of time, may
not have been retained by other providers. Whether information is
retained will not be known until legal process is submitted and the
results are received.
11. Summary: Challenges in Identifying, Preserving, Requesting
and Obtaining Electronic Evidence
As the steps to obtain ECPA records demonstrate, a fair amount
of time can be taken to identify, preserve, request and receive the
electronic records. Delays may occur at each step in the process. Time
typically makes all the difference in obtaining the evidence or in de-
termining whether new leads can be discovered and pursued. Law en-
forcement must race to obtain the fleeting information before the
retention period lapses and must act as soon as new leads are
developed.
The foregoing example is a fairly straightforward one involving a
request for information based on one lead and information provided
by the victim.120 For many Internet crimes, comparable leads are be-
ing pursued for multiple providers at the same time. The next part
highlights the complication where proxies or redirection efforts are
undertaken by the defendant.
D. Acts to Conceal Criminal Activity: Use of Proxy, Redirection or
Concealment Tools
In contrast to the foregoing straightforward example involving
only one account, in most cases the process of collecting Internet evi-
dence is more extensive and time consuming. Usually pursuing inves-
tigative steps is much more complicated, particularly when
sophisticated criminals seeking to evade detection by law enforcement
are involved. A number of tools can be used to conceal the perpetra-
tors or to make it appear that someone else may be responsible for the
criminal activity.
120. For another example of similar straightforward investigative facts which led to the
identification of the defendant, see Trotter where the court affirmed a section 1030(a)(5)
conviction for hacking into the Salvation Army computer network and noted that the “in-
vestigation discovered the intrusions into the Salvation Army’s network originated from a
DSL account in St. Louis, Missouri, registered to . . . Trotter’s girlfriend and co-habitant”
and that the “email address attached to the account included Trotter’s first name, last
initial, and birth year.” United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2007). Most
cases are much more involved and time-consuming in following the electronic evidence
leads.
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Building on the investigative facts above, assume that the defen-
dant used a proxy or took steps to deliberately “bounce” through
other internet locations as part of an effort to conceal the source of
the Internet activity.121 Each connection will take time to determine
who holds the records at the proxy or jump off point. At the end of
the sequence, the final provider may no longer retain the records that
confirm who committed the offense or that show how the offense was
committed.
The provider for the victim’s computer checks the access logs to
determine what the Internet Protocol address was for the last com-
puter making a connection. The provider is unable to determine the
source of the Internet activity and can only look to the last computer
connecting with the victim’s account.
The following summary demonstrates these challenges building
on the prior steps.
1. Discovery of Access Through Another Site or Location
Building on the example above, assume in step nine that law en-
forcement received information from the provider based on the initial
Internet evidence (such as an Internet Protocol address).122 The in-
formation from the first provider reveals that the account access was
actually made through another site by a particular Internet Protocol
address (which will later be confirmed to be a proxy site).
As related in step two above, law enforcement will make a request
under section 2703(f) to preserve information from the new Internet
evidence lead. The same steps (3 through 9) will be followed to pre-
121. A “proxy” provides a “middleman” connection on the Internet. The use of the
proxy conceals the original Internet Protocol address of the user requesting the informa-
tion. See GLOSSARY OF SECURITY TERMS, supra note 4, at 146 (defining “proxy” as “an applica-
tion that ‘breaks’ the connection between client and server. The proxy accepts certain
types of traffic entering or leaving a network and processes it and forwards it. This effec-
tively closes the straight path between the internal and external networks making it more
difficult for an attacker to obtain internal addresses and other details of the organization’s
internal network”).
An example of the redirection of Internet activity abroad to conceal domestic activity
can be found in the CAN-SPAM Act prosecution in Kilbride. See United States v. Kilbride,
584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming convictions). Trial evidence showed that the de-
fendants “arranged to remotely log on to servers in Amsterdam, to make it look like their
spam messages were being sent from abroad, when in reality Kilbride and Schaffer were
operating their business from inside the United States.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Jury Convicts Two Men for Running International Pornographic Spamming Business
(June 25, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_crm_453.
html.
122. See supra Part II.C.9.
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pare and submit legal process for approval to the court and then sub-
mit the legal process to the provider. At this juncture, it is unknown
whether there will be an electronic evidence lapse in the newly identi-
fied Internet lead.123 In other words, given the limited retention pe-
riod on the Internet records, the time taken to obtain and pursue the
initial Internet evidence lead may exceed the retention period for the
newly discovered lead. The lapse in the new records may require clos-
ing the investigation. Whether any relevant information is in the ac-
count will not be known until legal process is pursued and the
provider gives the information to law enforcement.
2. Tracing the Use of Multiple Proxies
Building on this basic example, let’s turn to a more realistic one.
Assume that the defendant (E) took extra steps to conceal Internet
activity by using three proxies (B, C, and D) to connect to the victim’s
computer (A). In the following Proxy Diagram, assume the following
Internet Protocol addresses for each computer were used:124
Proxy Diagram:
Third Proxy Second First Proxy Defendant
Victim (A) (B) Proxy (C) (D) (E)
12.34.56.77 34.56.78.99 56.78.90.11 78.90.12.33 11.22.33.44
Starting with the victim’s computer or account (A), law enforce-
ment will have to trace each connection, using the steps in the Dia-
gram, provider by provider (B then C then D), to determine the
original Internet transmission source (E) (defendant). For example,
law enforcement will first determine who was the provider and ac-
count holder for computer (B) using IP Address 34.56.78.99 (listed as
Third Proxy) to connect with the victim (who was using computer (A)
(victim computer) and IP Address 12.34.56.77) at the date and time of
the crime. Initially, questions may focus on whether the crime was
committed by the user of computer (B) (third proxy) since it made
the connection to the victim’s account. At this point, it is not known
whether computer (B) is the final link in the chain.
123. For a discussion of the “electronic evidence lapse” problem see supra Part II.B.2.
124. Instead of using a proxy, the defendant could hack into a series of computer net-
works before connecting to the victim’s computer or account to disguise the source of the
Internet activity. The same investigative steps would be followed.
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By following the steps in the Proxy Diagram above, in the event
that the provider for computer (B) (IP Address 34.56.78.99) has re-
tained this information, law enforcement will learn for the first time
that at the same date and time of the access to the victim’s computer
or account (A), the Internet communication or transmission was
made through another account (C) (here Second Proxy) through IP
Address 56.78.90.11. These records now confirm that no one using
computer or network (B) was responsible for the crime. In this man-
ner, the electronic records exclude an initial suspect or lead. Instead,
computer (B) was used as a proxy (here third proxy). New questions
arise. Did computer (C) initiate the crime or was it also used as a
proxy?
If the provider for computer (B) (IP Address 34.56.78.99) did not
retain the information about the access, then the investigation cannot
proceed. Unless there is other independent evidence, this investiga-
tion may be closed. The victim will have no remedy in the criminal
justice process.
Assuming that the provider for computer (B) (IP Address
34.56.78.99) retained the necessary records, once again, law enforce-
ment will seek to learn the identity of the provider and account
holder for this computer (C) using this IP Address at this time. Legal
process will be pursued. If the records are retained, law enforcement
will learn about the existence of computer (D) (here, the first proxy
using IP Address 78.90.12.33). As legal process is obtained to identify
the provider and user of IP Address 78.90.12.33 at the date and time
of the crime, it remains unknown whether there are more links and
proxies in the chain. In the event that the provider for computer (D)
(IP Address 78.90.12.33) retained the necessary records, law enforce-
ment will learn about computer (E) using IP Address 11.22.33.44,
which turns out to be the defendant’s computer. With this informa-
tion, law enforcement may obtain a search warrant for the computer
used by the defendant. If the records have not been removed or de-
leted, law enforcement may be able to connect the user, the defen-
dant, to the unauthorized access to the victim through the first,
second and third proxies.
This process can consume a substantial amount of time. When
the crime was first reported, it was unknown whether or how many
proxy computers may have been used. Only if each provider has re-
tained the Internet access and other records will the crime be solved.
The number of proxies (or links between computers) will be un-
known until the final destination is identified.
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This example, which is fairly straightforward, demonstrates the
challenges that law enforcement confronts in seeking to obtain In-
ternet records to confirm the unauthorized access of the victims com-
puter (A). If the records are retained at four providers, law
enforcement may be able to solve the crime. If not, unless other inde-
pendent evidence is available, the investigation may be closed.
One more realistic update: assume that the use of the proxies is
not linear (from E to D to C to B to A). Instead, the defendant jum-
bles the use of the proxies by using some proxies more than once
(such as from E to D to B to C to D to B to C to A). Law enforcement
will have to trace each link. With more links, the risk of an electronic
evidence lapse increases.
3. Summary
These examples demonstrate that identifying, requesting and ob-
taining electronic records involves a race against time and many dis-
crete steps along the way. The mere preservation alone does not
ensure that necessary electronic evidence from the Internet will be
available. There are many steps in the process that may result in delay.
Even if the initial Internet evidence lead is preserved and obtained by
law enforcement, new leads may be unavailable as a result of the elec-
tronic evidence lapse. A longer retention period enhances the likeli-
hood that necessary evidence may be available for law enforcement
use. None of the records will be provided unless law enforcement sub-
mits sufficient legal process.
E. Division of Criminal Labor
Another complicating factor in cracking criminal conspiracies is
the division of labor that may be used to commit the crime.125 This
division of labor is common for more sophisticated crimes. The chal-
lenge for law enforcement is that the criminal actors and evidence of
crimes committed on the Internet may be in many different
jurisdictions.
For example, in trade secret prosecutions, it is not uncommon
for a trusted insider with access to the information to misappropriate
or steal the trade secret. This individual usually has technical and spe-
cialized skills to develop the trade secret. However, he usually lacks
the skills and ability to develop, manufacture or market the misappro-
125. As an example, a division of labor normally occurs in a conspiracy where each
defendant contributes different skills or steps to further the crime.
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priated trade secret. Others with these skills may be invited to join the
conspiracy. The evidence trail showing preparation, planning, misap-
propriation and use among these participants will typically be scat-
tered in multiple locations.
As another example, in an online fraud case:
[T]he tasks of [1] writing code, [2] locating hosts for phishing
sites, [3] spamming, and [4] other components of a full-scale
phishing operation may be divided among people in various loca-
tions. This means that in some phishing investigations, timely co-
operation between law enforcement agencies in multiple countries
may be necessary for tracing, identification, and apprehension of
the criminals behind the scheme.126
In a criminal copyright prosecution involving the unlawful distri-
bution of copyrighted works on the Internet, the division of labor
included:
Higher level members of the warez groups, known as site operators
or “SiteOps,” [who] administered and maintained the site and con-
trolled access to the site by use of security measures such as
usernames and passwords. Others serve as “equipment suppliers”
(providing hardware (such as hard drives, computer parts, and
computer servers) to the warez site), “encoders” or “crackers”
(those defeating copy protection devices); “scripters” (creating,
programming, and helping build the warez site); “brokers” (who
found groups to participate on the warez site). Lower level mem-
bers included “suppliers” (providing an unauthorized copyrighted
movie, game or software), “cammers” (those making unauthorized
camcorder recordings in movie theaters), “couriers.”127
This division of labor may require law enforcement to coordinate
with partners in other jurisdictions. The race to obtain Internet evi-
dence is thus further complicated.
F. Multi-Jurisdictional, International Issues
Another race involves gathering evidence in other countries.
Given the global reach of the Internet, it is not uncommon for evi-
dence of the crime to be in another country. For example, “phishing”
cases may involve individuals who organize and plan the scheme in
different countries.128
126. REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 11.
127. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Additional Defendants Charged with
Violating Copyright Laws as Part of Operation Copycat (April 6, 2006), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2006/soaresCharge.htm. The au-
thors prosecuted “Operation Copycat” during their tenure in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
the Northern District of California.
128. See, e.g., REPORT ON PHISHING, supra note 1, at 11 (noting concern that “full-
fledged criminal organizations in various countries” were organizing “to conduct phishing
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Another potential source of delay may result from obtaining elec-
tronic or other evidence maintained in other countries. While estab-
lished procedures facilitate requests for assistance in other countries,
the process takes longer than a domestic request.129 As noted below,
among other requirements, the legal requests must be translated into
the language of the country where the evidence is located before the
request may be submitted.
The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs
(“OIA”) coordinates requests for evidence with their counterparts in
other countries. Normally, the request must be submitted through ei-
ther a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”),130 or letter roga-
tory.131 The requests must be translated into the language of the
country in which assistance is sought.132
An MLAT request is based upon a treaty between countries which
sets forth the process and circumstances in which one country may
request evidence for a criminal case which is maintained in another
country.133 The law enforcement request may include identifying sub-
scriber account information, obtaining witness interviews or deposi-
schemes on a systematic basis” premised on “indications that criminal groups in Europe
are hiring or contracting with hackers to produce phishing e-mails and websites and de-
velop malicious code for use in phishing attacks.”); Operation Phish Phry, supra note 13
(providing a case example of this approach).
129. See House Hearings: Data Retention As a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes, supra
note 27, at 70–71 (statement of Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United
States) (describing a multinational law enforcement operation which took law enforce-
ment officials in Australia and the United States two years to rescue a girl in Georgia after
videos of her being abused were distributed on the Internet); see also Robin Bowles, In
Harms Way: Australian police played a key role in finding a young girl at the mercy of a brutal
pedophile, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 25, 2009, available at http://www.smh.com.au/na-
tional/in-harms-way-20090724-dw6l.html (describing international investigation and assis-
tance by Australian law enforcement).
130. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL 276 (1997) [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL], available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00276.htm
(describing the process for handling treaty requests).
131. See generally CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 130, at 275, available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00275.htm (describ-
ing the process for handling a letter rogatory).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (2006) (transmittal of letter rogatory or request); id. § 1782
(assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals). See
generally CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 130, at 282, available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/ usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00282.htm#282 (noting re-
quirement of translations).
133. See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 10,
1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-17 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ or-
ganization/121413.pdf.
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tions or testimony,134 seizure of records and evidence, certification of
foreign business records,135 forfeiture of assets, and other law enforce-
ment steps. In the absence of an MLAT, a letter rogatory must be sub-
mitted by a judge who makes a formal request to the judiciary of
another country. While electronic records may be preserved if the
country in which the evidence is located is a member of the 24/7
Cyber Network, the request preserves existing records pending com-
pletion of the MLAT process.136
G. Summary
These examples are only a few among many others. They illus-
trate the inevitable delay that is inherent in the process of obtaining
electronic records for a criminal investigation. As these examples
show, law enforcement is constantly racing against clock to obtain
electronic records from providers. Delay is inherent and inevitable in
the process. Despite the best and prompt efforts of law enforcement,
whether the necessary Internet records are available may turn on the
retention policies of the provider.
III. Legislative Proposals Imposing New, Higher Standards
Under ECPA Fail to Consider and Address the
Resulting Delays for Law Enforcement in
Obtaining Fleeting Internet Records
Recent efforts have been advanced to amend ECPA, including
the Stored Communications Act.137 Some of the proposed ECPA
amendments would impose new and higher standards to obtain elec-
134. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be used to obtain the
deposition of “a prospective witness . . . in order to preserve testimony for trial.” FED. R.
CRIM. P. 15.
135. Foreign business records may be admitted under the certification requirements.
18 U.S.C. § 3505 (foreign records of regularly conducted activity); see also generally United
States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2006) (admitting foreign bank records from
Luxembourg and Israel under section 3505).
136. Council of Europe: Convention on Cybercrime, art. 35 (Nov. 23, 2001) E.T.S. No.
185 (establishing the Council of Europe 24/7 Network), available at http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm; see also Sergio Staro, The G8 24/7 Network
(May 13, 2010), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_
project_in_georgia/presentations/Regional%20Ws%20on%20Cybercrime_13May10/2215
_The_G8_24-7%20Network_SStaro.pdf (describing the operation of the 24/7 Network).
The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention is an example of how the international
community came together to address the practical realities recognizing the need to obtain
electronic evidence in other countries.
137. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1011, 112th Cong. (2011); ECPA 2.0 Act of 2012, H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. (2012).
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tronic evidence and records.138 None of these proposals considers or
addresses the impact of new delays that would result from the higher
standards for law enforcement to obtain electronic records.
While we leave to policymakers the task of determining the merits
of such proposals, part of the debate should recognize that adding
further delay to an already burdensome process would result in less
information being available to law enforcement from the trail of In-
ternet evidence. The evidence involves information that the defen-
dant voluntarily provided to third party Internet providers while the
crime was being committed.
Any serious proposal should explicitly answer the question of how
much longer law enforcement would be delayed in obtaining Internet
records under the proposed new standards. The proposals should also
consider how the “electronic record lapse” problem would be ad-
dressed. The public policy consequence of further delay will result in
the inability of law enforcement to solve crimes in which Internet evi-
dence may be vital. Many examples have been noted in which crimes
were solved based on electronic records.139
As part of this public policy debate, to the extent that further
delay would result from any legislative proposals, the greater need for
mandatory retention policies must be considered. Only by ensuring
that the records are retained and available to law enforcement upon
sufficient legal process can the legitimate needs of law enforcement
be met.
IV. Moving Toward Longer Retention Policies
Steps to increase the retention of Internet-based records will bet-
ter ensure that key evidence may be available to prove the crime. The
138. See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting Pri-
vacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (state-
ment of James A. Baker, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. of the U.S.), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/congress/ 2011_hr/ecpa.pdf (in considering amendments to ECPA, “what we
must not do—either intentionally or unintentionally—is unnecessarily hinder the Govern-
ment’s ability to effectively and efficiently enforce the criminal law and protect national
security. The Government’s ability to access, review, analyze, and act promptly upon the
communications of criminals that we lawfully acquire, as well as data pertaining to such
communications, is vital to our mission to protect the public from terrorists, spies, organ-
ized criminals, kidnappers, and other malicious actors. At the Department of Justice, we
are prepared to consider reasonable proposals to update the statute—and indeed, as set
forth in my written statement for the record, we have a few of our own to suggest—pro-
vided that they do not compromise our ability to protect the public from the real threats
that we face.”).
139. See supra Part Intro.A.1–2 (providing examples of crime involving the Internet).
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records would not be provided unless law enforcement could make
the requisite showing to obtain legal process. For example, the con-
tents of communications may be obtained with a search warrant under
present law.140
Over the past decade and a half, senior law enforcement officials
and members of Congress have suggested a national retention policy
may be needed. Most of the discussion has occurred concerning how
to best combat the sexual exploitation of children, however, the same
concerns and steps are involved in investigating other crimes.
A. Voluntary Steps by Industry Should Be Considered
Ideally, voluntary industry steps to retain key electronic records
should be promoted. Some providers have indicated a willingness to
establish a longer period of retention for selected Internet records141
and some members of Congress have strongly suggested that industry
take the lead in this area.142 This suggests that industry may be able to
develop appropriate retention standards without a mandatory require-
ment imposed under law. If so, these voluntary steps should be en-
couraged. Of course, core questions will remain, specifically what
records should be retained and for how long?
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
141. E.g., House Hearings: Making the Internet Safe, supra note 94, at 95 (statement of
Tom Daily, General Counsel, Verizon Communications) (“While the debate over data re-
tention is still forming, Verizon’s general view is that IP address assignment and customer
record information collected in the normal course of business could be retained by net-
work providers for a reasonable period of time, and if retention is required, that the period
of retention should be long enough reasonably to enable law enforcement to conduct
their investigations. Whether this obligation should extend to others in the Internet com-
munity is still open to debate, as is whether the period of retention should be 24 months
(as has been proposed) or a shorter period more in line with the retention policies of
businesses in effect today.”); see also, e.g., id. at 96 (statement of Jerry Lewis, Vice President,
Deputy General Counsel, and the Chief Privacy Officer of Comcast) (“Because of the im-
portance of child safety, we want to do more. We have decided to extend our retention of
IP address assignment information to 180 days.”).
142. See House Hearings: Data Retention As a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes, supra
note 27, at 65 (statement of Rep. Deborah Wasserman Schultz) (“Voluntarily would be a
lot better than mandating this. I think that is what we would all like to see, including law
enforcement.”); id. at 74–75 (statement of Rep. Tom Marino) (“So I implore you, please
regulate this to the extent where it is effective and efficient yourselves because, I can agree
with the Chairman and my colleagues, at one point, we will step in.”).
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B. Past Executive Branch and Law Enforcement Support for Data
Retention Standards
For more than a dozen years, executive branch officials in the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have
supported longer retention periods for electronic evidence. While
much of the discussion concerns child exploitation cases, the same
hurdles apply to other Internet-based offenses.
In 1999, then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., sup-
ported data retention by ISPs.143 At an international conference, he
recommended: “we must take steps to ensure that we can obtain the
evidence necessary to identify child pornographers. That means cer-
tain data must be retained by ISPs for reasonable periods of time so
that it can be accessible to law enforcement.”144
In 2006 Senate committee testimony, Attorney General Alberto
R. Gonzales suggested that the retention of records was important in
child exploitation cases:
As we’ve looked at ways to improve the law enforcement response
to the problem of online exploitation and abuse of children, one
thing we’ve continuously heard from state and local investigators
and prosecutors is that many Internet Service Providers don’t re-
tain records for a sufficient period of time. Several months ago, I
asked a working group within the Department to look at this issue,
and we’re working hard on ways to remedy this problem.145
143. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
144. Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Remarks at the International Confer-
ence on Combating Child Pornography on the Internet (Sept. 29, 1999) (transcript on file
with the University of San Francisco Law Review); see also Declan McCullagh, Obama’s Attor-
ney General Pick: Good on Privacy?, CNET NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13578_3-10110922-38.html (noting comments from 1999).
145. Combating Child Pornography by Eliminating Pornographers’ Access to the Financial Pay-
ment System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
9 (2006) [hereinafter Combating Child Pornography] (statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y
Gen. of the United States), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Files.View&FileStore_id=53efb328-0d12-4eb9-a1df-eaaf502be49d; see also Alberto R.
Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Remarks at the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (April 20, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/
ag_speech_060420.html (“The investigation and prosecution of child predators depends
critically on the availability of evidence that is often in the hands of Internet service provid-
ers. This evidence will be available for us to use only if the providers retain the records for
a reasonable amount of time. Unfortunately, the failure of some Internet service providers
to keep records has hampered our ability to conduct investigations in this area. As a result,
I have asked the appropriate experts at the Department to examine this issue and provide
me with proposed recommendations. And I will reach out personally to the CEOs of the
leading service providers, and to other industry leaders, to solicit their input and assis-
tance. Record retention by Internet service providers consistent with the legitimate privacy
rights of Americans is an issue that must be addressed.”); Anne Broache, U.S. Attorney Gen-
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In 2008, during oversight hearings, FBI Director Robert S. Muel-
ler, III, agreed that a two-year retention period for Internet Service
Providers was appropriate and consistent with other countries:
Mr. [RIC] KELLER. Is the challenge them [Internet Service Prov-
iders] not cooperating or them not keeping their records long
enough?
Mr. MUELLER. It is a question of having a standard against which
you retain the records. The European Union has a standard now
for ISPs that generally can go up to 2 years. And some of the con-
cerns are the storage. Some of the concerns are developing the
software that would allow you to keep the requisite records.
But from the perspective of an investigator, having that backlog of
records would be tremendously important if somebody comes up
on your screen now and you want to know and make the case as to
the past activity of that individual. If those records are only kept 15
days or 30 days, you may lose the information you need to be able
to bring the person to justice.
Mr. KELLER. Are you suggesting a 2-year guideline comparable to
other countries?
Mr. MUELLER. I believe that would be helpful, yes.146
During congressional hearings in 2011, the Department of Justice
underscored its continued support for data retention standards in or-
der to address law enforcement needs. Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jason Weinstein testified:
Currently, despite the diligent and efficient work by law enforce-
ment officers at all levels, critical data has too often been deleted
by providers before law enforcement can obtain that lawful pro-
cess. This gap between providers’ retention practices and the
eral Calls for ‘Reasonable’ Data Retention, CNET NEWS (Apr. 20, 2006), http://news.cnet.
com/U.S.-attorney-general-calls-for-reasonable-data-retention/2100-1030_3-6063185.html
(“‘Record retention by Internet service providers (that is) consistent with the legitimate
privacy rights of Americans is an issue that must be addressed.’”); Declan McCullagh, Gon-
zales pressures ISPs on data retention, CNET News (May 26, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/
Gonzales-pressures-ISPs-on-data-retention/2100-1028_3-6077654.html?tag=contentMain;
contentBody;1n (“U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and FBI Director Robert Muel-
ler on Friday urged telecommunications officials to record their customers’ Internet activi-
ties . . . .”).
146. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 54 (2008) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/
41904.pdf; see also id. at 37 (“[R]ecords retention by ISPs would be tremendously helpful in
giving us the historical basis to make a case in a number of these child predators who
utilize the Internet to either push their pornography or to lure persons in order to meet
them.”); id. at 75 (noting “that records retention would be of assistance in terms of ad-
dressing these problems”); Declan McCullagh, FBI, Politicos Renew Push for ISP Data Reten-
tion Laws, CNET NEWS (Apr. 23, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9926803-38.
html (“FBI Director Robert Mueller told a House of Representatives committee that In-
ternet service providers should be required to keep records of users’ activities for two
years.”).
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needs of law enforcement can be extremely harmful to investiga-
tions that are critical to protecting the public from predators and
other criminals.. . .
In short, the lack of adequate, uniform and consistent data reten-
tion policies threatens our ability to use the legal tools Congress
has provided to law enforcement to protect public safety.147
More recently, on September 19, 2012, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Di-
vision in the U.S. Department of Justice, noted the impact on solving
complex cybercrime of the inability to obtain electronic evidence
from providers. As he framed the challenge:
The lack of data retention by ISPs and other providers is a serious
problem and one that many within and outside the Department of
Justice have recognized. Today’s cybercriminals are more sophisti-
cated than ever. They use botnets, proxy servers and other meth-
ods to hide their true identities. To track them down, we often
need to follow an electronic trail, frequently around the globe, and
that usually means obtaining a search warrant or other legal pro-
cess to gain access to critical online data. To the extent that follow-
ing such trails is made more difficult—because the legal standards
become more stringent, or because ISPs delete the data too
quickly—our job as law enforcement officers will also become
more difficult.148
Other law enforcement groups have urged the adoption of reten-
tion policies. For example, in 2006, 49 state attorneys general wrote a
letter to congressional leaders urging Congress to move toward a fed-
eral solution on data retention that would meet the needs of law en-
forcement and privacy concerns. The letter noted:
Because ISPs are often national, if not global businesses, data re-
tention requirements are better suited for federal legislation than
state legislation that may vary by jurisdiction; a position supported
by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Ac-
cordingly, we call on Congress to dedicate the resources necessary
to study this issue and to implement a meaningful national stan-
dard for ISP data retention that provides law enforcement with the
tools necessary to combat the spread of internet-based crimes
against children. In doing so, we encourage you to work with law
enforcement at all levels of government and the ISP industry itself,
147. House Hearings: Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes, supra note
27, at 7; see also id. at 47–48 (suggesting that a data retention requirement should “apply to
all crimes not just to child exploitation”).
148. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Speech at Fordham University School of
Law (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/
crm-speech-120919.html.
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and to adopt a standard that respects the legitimate privacy rights
of citizens.149
Also in 2006, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(“IACP”) adopted a resolution urging adoption of a uniform data re-
tention standard. Among other findings, the resolution noted:
[T]he failure of the Internet access provider industry to retain sub-
scriber information and source or destination information for any
uniform, predictable, reasonable period has resulted in the ab-
sence of data, which has become a significant hindrance and even
an obstacle in certain investigations, such as computer intrusion
investigations and child obscenity and exploitation investigations,
although law enforcement has generally acted expeditiously in
processing lawful requests to Internet providers.150
The resolution provided:
RESOLVED that the IACP strongly urges national legislatures, the
Internet administration and telephony communities, including re-
gional Internet registries, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, domain-name registries, domain-name regis-
trars, Internet access and service providers, and telecommunica-
tion providers, to develop an appropriate but uniform data
retention mandate for both the aforementioned Internet adminis-
tration community and telephony service providers requiring the
retention of customer subscriber information and source and desti-
nation information for a minimum specified reasonable period of
time so that it will be available to the law enforcement community,
upon applicable legal process, to enhance public safety and pre-
vent, deter, or detect terrorists and criminals through the ability to
investigate offenses facilitate by use of the Internet and telephony
. . .151
These examples demonstrate a continuing interest by the highest
officials in federal law enforcement and others for a national data re-
tention requirement. Law enforcement support for data retention has
been highlighted for more than a dozen years.
149. See Letter from 49 State Attorneys General to Congress (June 21, 2006), available
at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20060622.dr-letter-final.pdf. In a transi-
tion paper for the new Obama Administration, the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral listed the issue of mandating data retention standards. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN.,
INTERIM BRIEFING PAPER, PREPARED FOR: PRESIDENT-ELECT BARACK OBAMA TRANSITION TEAM
(2009), available at http://otrans.3cdn.net/20ef0c0e1525cbf366_gpvm6gcxo.pdf.
150. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 2006 RESOLUTIONS: SUPPORT FOR DATA RETEN-
TION IN AID OF THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES FACILITATED OR COMMITTED THROUGH THE
USE OF THE INTERNET AND TELEPHONY-BASED COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 45 (2006)
(adopted at the 113th Annual Conference), available at http:// www.theiacp.org/resolu-
tion/2006Resolutions.pdf.
151. Id. at 46.
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C. Recent Legislative Support and Legislation
Some members of Congress have also voiced support for data re-
tention standards. A congressional staff report suggested that consid-
eration should be given to mandate that Internet Service Providers
retain “IP address information linked to subscriber information.”152
Over the past few congresses, legislation has been introduced which
would require data retention.
1. Current Congress: 112th Congress
In the current Congress, legislation has been reported out of
committee and is pending for consideration by the House of Repre-
sentatives. On May 25, 2011, House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Lamar Smith (R-Texas) and Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Sch-
ultz (D-Florida) introduced H.R. 1981, the Protecting Children From
Internet Pornographers Act of 2011.153 On July 12, 2011, hearings
were held before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security. Chairman Smith testified that the re-
tention provision was based on a comparable Federal
Communications Commission standard for telephone records:
H.R. 1981 directs Internet service providers to retain Internet pro-
tocol addresses to assist Federal law enforcement officials with
child pornography and other Internet investigations. This is a nar-
row provision that addresses the retention of only the Internet pro-
tocol addresses that providers assign to their customers. It does not
require the retention of any content. So the bill does not read any
legitimate privacy interests of the Internet users. . . . H.R. 1981 re-
quires providers to retain these records for 18 months. This mir-
rors an existing FCC regulation that requires telephone companies
to retain for 18 months all toll records, including the name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of the caller, plus each telephone
number called and the date, time, and length of the call. In effect,
this bill merely applies to the Internet what has applied to tele-
phones for decades.154
152. STAFF REPORT: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET, supra
note 20, at 4 (“Due to the fact that harm may be occurring to a child in real-time during an
investigation involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet, Congress
should consider requiring ISPs that provide connectivity to the Internet to retain such IP
address information linked to subscriber information necessary to allow law enforcement
agents to identify the IP address being used to download or transmit child pornography
images and only for so long as necessary to accomplish that purpose.”).
153. Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th
Cong. (2011).
154. House Hearing: Protecting Children, supra note 57, at 16 (referring to 47 C.F.R. § 42.6
(1986)) (“Each carrier that offers or bills toll telephone service shall retain for a period of
18 months such records as are necessary to provide the following billing information about
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House Judiciary Subcommittee member, Congresswoman Sheila
Jackson Lee (D-Texas), framed the issue as trying to balance different
interests: “at [the] crux of this issue is determining a balance between
the necessary amount of data retention which would best serve law
enforcement, the impact of added retention costs on providers, and
the looming privacy concerns of the majority of law abiding Internet
users.”155
The House Judiciary Committee reported out the measure, as
amended, on December 9, 2011. The bill remains pending for consid-
eration by the House of Representatives.156 As reported, the retention
period was reduced to “a period of at least one year” and would apply
to a “commercial provider of an electronic communication service”
requiring retention of “a log of the temporarily assigned network ad-
dresses the provider assigns to a subscriber to or customer of such
service that enables the identification of the corresponding customer
or subscriber information.”157 The measure provides a “Sense of Con-
gress” that records “should be stored securely to protect customer pri-
vacy and prevent against breaches of the records.”158 The retention
period is not limited to child pornography cases and applies to all
data. Given higher costs in retaining data, the measure eliminates a
private right of action against the provider, available under current
law, for disclosing information to law enforcement.159
Identical legislation has been introduced in the Senate. On June
30, 2011, Senator Orin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced S. 1308, entitled
Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, with
Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota) and Senator Marco Rubio (R-
Florida).160 The measure also proposed an 18-month retention period
of “a log of the temporarily assigned network addresses that the ser-
telephone toll calls: the name, address, and telephone number of the caller, telephone
number called, date, time and length of the call. Each carrier shall retain this information
for toll calls that it bills whether it is billing its own toll service customers for toll calls or
billing customers for another carrier.”).
155. Id. at 81; see also id. at 42–43 (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic
Privacy Information Center) (raising concerns about the impact on privacy).
156. H.R. Rep. No. 112-281, pt. 1 (2011).
157. See H.R. 1981; H.R. REP. NO. 112-281, at 22 (amendment to narrow the retention
period to 180 days was defeated by a vote of 12 to 14); id. at 50 n.40 (a one-year period was
adopted by a manager’s amendment to the bill).
158. See H.R. 1981, § 4(b).
159. Id. § 5.
160. Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers, S. 1308, 112th Cong. (2011);
see also 157 CONG. REC. S4294 (daily ed. June 30, 2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch
upon introduction noting “this bill requires companies such as Internet service providers
to retain information such as subscriber network addresses for at least 18 months . . . The
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vice provider assigns to each subscriber account, unless that address is
transmitted by radio communication.”161
2. Prior Congress: 111th Congress
In the prior Congress, Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) intro-
duced S. 436, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 2009), entitled the “In-
ternet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth
Act of 2009” or the “SAFETY Act.” The measure provided: “A provider
of an electronic communication service or remote computing service
shall retain for a period of at least two years all records or other infor-
mation pertaining to the identity of a user of a temporarily assigned
network address the service assigns to that user.”162 On the same day,
Congressman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) introduced a companion bill in
the House, H.R. 1076 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 2009), the “In-
ternet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth
Act.” The same retention period and provision was included in the
House bill.163 Neither measure received committee action in the prior
Congress.
D. Other Retention Practices
Mandatory retention periods have been adopted for a variety of
records. The European Parliament has adopted data retention re-
quirements for electronic records. Many other electronic records are
subject to retention standards concerning health, employment and
banking records.
1. Data Retention Directive
In 2006, the European Parliament in Brussels adopted a Data Re-
tention Directive requiring up to two years of data retention.164 The
retention period depends on the category of information, including e-
same bill has been introduced in the House by Judiciary Committee Chairman Rep. Lamar
Smith and Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz”).
161. Id. § 4.
162. Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth Act of
2009, S. 436, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
163. Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth Act, H.R.
1076 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
164. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the
Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communi-
cations Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:
PDF.
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mails and phone records. Each member of the European Union must
comport their national laws with the Data Retention Directive.
2. Compare Data Retention Requirements for Certain Records
A variety of records, electronic or otherwise, are subject to
mandatory retention standards. The retention period for these
records ranges from one to ten years. There are numerous medical,
banking and employee retention standards at the federal and state
levels. Only a few examples are noted below.
Under federal standards, many health care records must be main-
tained for five years or longer165 while many states have adopted a ten-
year retention period for health care records.166 Many states also im-
pose a retention requirement for dental records.167 Certain employ-
ment records must be retained for one to five years under federal
law.168 Generally, banking records must be retained for five years
under federal law.169
165. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(1) (2011) (“Medical records must be retained in
their original or legally reproduced form for a period of at least 5 years.”); id. § 485.638(c)
(medical “records are retained for at least 6 years from date of last entry, and longer if
required by State statute, or if the records may be needed in any pending proceeding”).
For certain exposure records, a longer period applies. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020(d)(1)(ii)
(2011) (30-year retention period for records of employees exposed to toxic substances and
harmful agents).
166. See, e.g., TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1050-02-.18 (“Osteopathic physicians must retain
medical records for at least 10 years from the last contact with the patient. However, immu-
nization records and records for incompetent patients must be retained indefinitely and
mammography records must be retained for 20 years. X-rays need only be retained for 4
years if there is a document that interprets the image that is kept in the medical record.
Medical records of minors must be retained for at least one year after the patient reaches
the age of majority or 10 years from the date of last contact, whichever is longer.”); 22 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 165.1(b)(1) (“A licensed physician shall maintain adequate medical
records of a patient for a minimum of seven years from the anniversary date of the date of
last treatment by the physician.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.190 (“Unless specified other-
wise by the department, a hospital shall retain and preserve all medical records which
relate directly to the care and treatment of a patient for a period of no less than ten years
following the most recent discharge of the patient; except the records of minors, which
shall be retained and preserved for a period of no less than three years following attain-
ment of the age of eighteen years, or ten years following such discharge, whichever is
longer.”).
167. See, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 108.8(b) (five-year retention period for dental
records); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0460-02-.12 (“All dental records must be retained for at
least ten years from the date of the dentist’s last contact with the patient.”).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2011) (one year retention period for “personnel or employ-
ment record made or kept by an employer” including application forms, and “records
having to do with hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or termination, rates of
pay or other terms of compensation, and selection for training or apprenticeship”).
169. 31 C.F.R. § 103.38 (2010) (five year retention period for covered banking
records).
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Many of these retention requirements have been in place for de-
cades and many of these records are maintained in electronic form.
These records include the most private of information concerning the
health, background and financial information of an individual.
The experience with mandatory retention requirements with
health, employment, banking and other records is instructive. As with
these records, steps can be taken to protect the privacy of the records.
V. Retention Policy Issues
As with other records subject to retention periods, some key pol-
icy issues are raised. First, what type of records should be covered?
Second, for how long should various records be retained? Is a tiered
approach appropriate depending on the records being retained?
A. Types of Records
No suggestion has been made that providers should create new
records. The question instead is, given that certain records are created
for business purposes and to provide a service to the customer, what
types of pre-existing records should be retained?
While there may be other categories, under ECPA, the records
generally fall under three categories. The first concerns information
about the account holder. This may include the customer’s name, ad-
dress, telephone connection records, or records of session times and
durations, length of service, types of service utilized, subscriber iden-
tity, and means and source of payment for services rendered.170 This
information may be useful to law enforcement to determine who was
using the Internet Protocol address at the time of the crime.
A second category involves non-content information concerning
transactional logs.171 For example, this may identify what Internet Pro-
tocol address was connected to the Internet and the activity of the
connections, including where and when. The information may reveal
data transfers, including volume, and the source and destination of
the user. Records could include connection log information.
Finally, a third category would include the content of communi-
cations, which may be obtained by a search warrant.172 Examples
would include text or email communications.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006).
171. Id. § 2703(c)(2)(E).
172. Id. § 2703(a).
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For law enforcement purposes, the more that can be known
about the account, the more helpful it may be in furthering the inves-
tigation. For example, Internet Protocol information may show the
Internet connections but not the purpose of the connections, which
may be revealed by content.
The legislation pending in the House of Representatives falls
under the first category, requiring retention for one year of “a log of
the temporarily assigned network addresses the provider assigns to a
subscriber to or customer of such service that enables the identifica-
tion of the corresponding customer or subscriber information.”173
Policy makers can decide what categories of records should be
maintained. For example, different health or banking records are re-
tained for different periods.
B. Retention Period
A second question concerns how long the records should be re-
tained. By comparison, some health care records are retained for up
to ten years.
Generally, in the criminal justice process, a five-year statute of
limitations applies for federal statutes.174 While there has not been
much suggestion for a five-year retention period, the statute of limita-
tions provides an outer limit for policy makers.175
The period of retention could be determined by the types of
records. This practice has been followed for health, employment,
banking and other records. Customer identification and payment
records could be subject to a longer retention period than the con-
tents of communications.
173. Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th
Cong. § 4 (2011).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is
found or information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed.”). See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31253, STATUTES OF
LIMITATION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW (2012), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf (contrasting various statutes of limitations for federal
offenses).
175. See generally House Hearings: Data Retention As a Tool for Investigating Internet Crimes,
supra note 27, at 68 (statement of Rep. Ben Quayle) (inquiring about matching the reten-
tion period with the statute of limitations period).
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C. What Access?
A third issue concerns what standard should apply for law en-
forcement to access the records. This factor becomes relevant because
the longer the period of time to obtain the records and the higher the
standard, the stronger the justification for a longer retention period.
D. Other Factors
Other factors to consider will include the costs of implementa-
tion and other alternatives that may be available.
While storage costs have decreased, the cost will turn in part on
the types of records retained. Some have suggested that the retention
of some data may not be as costly to maintain.176 To offset the costs,
the House measure disallows a private right of action against any pro-
vider for the disclosure of information to law enforcement.177
Another issue concerns whether retention may be maintained
through other alternatives. For example, some records may be retriev-
able in backup tapes.178 Many companies already backup their records
in the event they are needed. Some of the requested records may al-
ready be included in the scope of backed up records. These and re-
lated issues bear on the scope of records that may be retained.
Conclusion
This article has sought to provide a better understanding of the
challenges law enforcement confronts in obtaining Internet-based
records, often essential to investigate and prosecute crimes involving,
at least in part, the Internet. As noted, how much of the trail of In-
ternet evidence will be available often will turn on time and whether
the provider has retained them. Because these records are fleeting,
law enforcement is normally engaged in a race to obtain them.
As shown, delay is an inherent and inevitable part of the investiga-
tive process. In following investigative leads, whether records are pre-
sent will not be known until legal process is served on the provider.
176. See, e.g., House Hearings: Making the Internet Safe, supra note 94, at 281 (statement of
Michael Angus, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Fox Interactive Media,
MySpace.com) (in responding to the cost “to preserve those IP addresses for 12 months
instead of 90 days,” noting that “IP logs are such a small amount of data that I can’t imag-
ine that it would be cost prohibitive”).
177. H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011).
178. See, e.g., House Hearings: Making the Internet Safe, supra note 94, at 144 (statement of
Dave Baker, Vice President, Law and Public Policy, Earthlink, Inc.) (noting records re-
quested by law enforcement were obtained in backup archives within two weeks).
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This process of identifying new leads, preserving the account informa-
tion, and obtaining and presenting legal process can take many
months. Often, after pursuing new Internet leads, law enforcement
confronts the “electronic evidence lapse” problem, learning that key
records are no longer available.
Case examples also show that without these records, investiga-
tions must be closed. This has occurred multiple times concerning
sexual exploitation of children offenses.179
Before Congress amends ECPA, careful consideration will have to
be given to how any proposal will impact law enforcement’s ability to
investigate and prosecute crime. Any new amendments or standards
will impact significant public and criminal justice interests including:
(1) undermining confidence in the Internet; (2) hampering the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement to investigate and solve crimes com-
mitted over the Internet; (3) addressing the rights and interests of
crime victims; (4) frustrating the specific public policy objectives iden-
tified by Congress in enacting a particular criminal statute; (5) in pro-
viding a fair process, ensuring that the responsible perpetrators are
identified and fairly prosecuted in the criminal justice process; and
(6) balancing and respecting privacy interests. Any new proposal to
modify the standards should explicitly identify how much delay may
result to law enforcement. This will help ensure that the objectives of
law enforcement are not undermined.
In any legislative debate, the need to ensure data is retained for
law enforcement purposes will be as important today as it was in 1986
when ECPA was first enacted. If new standards are interposed or new
delays added, serious consideration should be given to limited reten-
tion periods for Internet data. Retention requirements are already
used for health, employment, banking and other records between one
to ten years. The same privacy concerns that are raised concerning
these records, many which are in electronic form, can be adequately
protected under ECPA.
In the end, whatever the policy makers decide in amending
ECPA, the impact on victims and the ability to attain legislative objec-
tives will turn on the availability of the records.
179. See supra Part Intro.C.2.
